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ABSTRACT
An Examination of Factors Contributing to a Reduction in Race–Based Subgroup
Differences on a Constructed Response Paper–and–Pencil Test of Achievement.
(August 2003)
Bryan D. Edwards, B.S., The University of Alabama;
M.S., University of South Alabama
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Winfred Arthur, Jr.
The objectives of the present study were to: (a) replicate the results of Arthur et
al. (2002) by comparing race–based subgroup differences on a multiple–choice and
constructed response test in a laboratory setting using a larger sample, (b) extend their
work by investigating the role of reading ability, test–taking skills, and test perceptions
that could explain why subgroup differences are reduced when the test format is
changed from multiple–choice to a constructed response format, and (c) assess the
criterion–related validity of the constructed response test.  Two hundred sixty White
and 204 African Americans completed a demographic questionnaire, Test Attitudes and
Perceptions Survey, a multiple–choice or constructed response test, the Raven's
Advanced Progressive Matrices Short Form, the Nelson–Denny Reading Test,
Experimental Test of Testwiseness, and a post–test questionnaire.  In general, the
pattern of results supported the hypotheses in the predicted direction.  For example,
although there was a reduction in subgroup differences in performance on the
constructed response compared to the multiple–choice test, the difference was not
iv
statistically significant.  However, analyses by specific test content yielded a significant
reduction in subgroup differences on the science reasoning section.  In addition, all of
the hypothesized study variables, with the exception of face validity, were significantly
related to test performance.  Significant subgroup differences were also obtained for all
study variables except for belief in tests and stereotype threat.  The results also indicate
that reading ability, test–taking skills, and perceived fairness partially mediated the
relationship between race and test performance.  Finally, the criterion–related validity
for the constructed response test was stronger than that for the multiple–choice test. 
The results suggested that the constructed response test format investigated in the
present study may be a viable alternative to the traditional multiple–choice format in
high–stakes testing to solve the organizational dilemma of using the most valid
predictors of job performance and simultaneously reducing subgroup differences and
subsequent adverse impact on tests of knowledge, skill, ability, and achievement. 
However, additional research is needed to further demonstrate the appropriateness of
the constructed response format as an alternative to traditional testing methods.
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1This dissertation follows the style and format of Journal of Applied Psychology.
INTRODUCTION
Arthur, Edwards, and Barrett (2002) found evidence that African
American–White test score differences on a cognitively loaded knowledge test were
much lower using a constructed response than a multiple–choice format.  However,
given the operational nature of the data, they were unable to empirically assess reasons
for this reduction in subgroup differences.  Therefore, the objectives of the present
study were to: (a) replicate the results of Arthur et al. (2002), (b) extend their work by
investigating the role of factors that could explain why race–based subgroup differences
may be reduced when the test format is changed from multiple–choice to constructed
response format, and (c) assess the criterion–related validity of the constructed response
test.  These objectives were accomplished using a college student sample in an
academic setting.
In the testing and personnel selection literature, paper–and–pencil tests of ability
and achievement have been shown to be the most valid predictors of job and training
performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  However, it has also been extensively
documented that cognitively loaded paper–and–pencil tests of knowledge, skill, ability,
and achievement generally display large subgroup differences (Bobko, Roth, &
Potosky, 1999; Hartigan & Wigdor, 1989) with a widely cited one standard deviation
difference in African American–White performance (Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Roth,
Bevier, Bobko, Switzer, & Tyler, 2001; Schmitt, Clause, & Pulakos, 1996).
This one standard deviation African American–White difference on
paper–and–pencil tests of ability and achievement typically results in adverse impact
2against African Americans.  A test or assessment tool displays adverse impact if there
are differential outcomes associated with the use of the test (e.g., selection, promotion)
as a function of a protected class status variable (i.e., race, sex, color, religion, national
origin, age, and disability).  The Uniform Guidelines (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 1978) established the 80% or the four–fifths rule as a general rule of
thumb for operationalizing adverse impact.  Using this rule, adverse impact on a
selection instrument occurs against a specified subgroup of a protected class when the
proportion of the subgroup class members meeting a cut score on the instrument is less
than 80% of the proportion of other subgroup class members meeting the same cut
score.  Other operationalizations of adverse impact include statistical significance tests
such as Fisher's exact test.
In the context of testing and personnel selection, race has been the primary,
although not only, Title VII protected class of interest.  The presence of subgroup
differences and associated adverse impact has important implications for individuals,
organizations, and society at large.  For individuals adversely impacted by a test, there
is a loss of employment opportunities and all the benefits associated with such.  There
are also psychological and emotional costs that often result from being adversely
impacted by a selection test.  From the organization's perspective, there is the dilemma
of using the most valid predictors of job performance and concurrently minimizing the
legal, ethical, and professional liabilities associated with using tests that display adverse
impact (Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson, & Kabin, 2001).  Thus, subgroup differences
present a special dilemma for organizations which simultaneously seek to reduce
3adverse impact on tests and still preserve the advantages associated with using valid
predictors of job performance.
At the societal level, there are issues pertaining to addressing past social wrongs,
diversity, and equal opportunity (Doverspike, Taylor, & Arthur, 1999).  The racial and
ethnic composition of society's workforce and hence socioeconomic strata is directly
affected by decisions based on high–stakes testing.  For example, standardized
achievement tests such as the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) are used for
determining admissions and scholarship allocations for college and graduate schools. 
Licensing and certification exams and employment tests, which measure knowledge,
skills, and abilities also influence a society's workforce (Sackett et al., 2001).  Many
opponents of standardized preemployment selection systems, especially those that yield
adverse impact against protected classes, argue that minority group membership
warrants preferential treatment in the selection process to compensate for the long
history of discrimination and social inequities suffered by members of some minority
groups.  This position is predicated on the assumption that these observed subgroup
differences are the direct or indirect result of past legal discrimination (for reviews of
this issue see Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing, 2003; Doverspike & Arthur, 1995;
Doverspike et al., 1999; Taylor–Carter, Doverspike, & Cook, 1995).  Therefore,
adverse impact poses a stumbling block for equal opportunity employers and
organizations with affirmative action programs that value increasing workplace
diversity to compensate for past inequities.  In some instances, racial diversity is
encouraged by legislation and mandated by the courts for organizations that have
historically discriminated against minority employees.  Previously successful attempts
4to increase workplace diversity, such as subgroup norming and affirmative action have
been legally challenged or prohibited (Civil Rights Act, 1991; Hopwood v. State of
Texas, 1996).  Thus, finding other means of reducing adverse impact has
unquestionable value.
However, one thing that remains unclear is whether the widely cited one
standard deviation difference on cognitively loaded paper–and–pencil tests of
knowledge, skill, ability, and achievement is a construct or method phenomenon
(Arthur, Day, McNelly, & Edens, 2003; Arthur et al., 2002; Roth, Bevier et al., 2001;
Schmitt et al., 1996).  That is, do test score differences reflect real race differences on
the underlying construct (e.g., cognitive ability) or do they reflect test bias such that the
observed subgroup differences are artifactual and not real differences on the underlying
construct?
Environmental (Ceci & Williams, 1997; Fischer, Houte, Jankowski, Lucas,
Swidler, & Voss, 1996) and biological and genetic (Jensen, 1985; Rushton & Ankey,
1996) explanations have been offered for observed subgroup differences on tests of
knowledge, skill, ability and achievement.  For example, large correlations (e.g., .50 –
.90) are commonly reported for the relationship between cognitive ability and education
level (Ceci, 1991; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Neisser et al., 1996).  Most theories
describe this relationship as causal with higher levels of cognitive ability resulting in
higher amounts of education.  However, Ceci (1991) and Ceci and Williams (1997)
argue that the reverse causal relationship may be just as strong and review evidence for
the environmental determinants of cognitive ability.  Specifically, they provide
evidence for the hypothesis that education level significantly affects cognitive ability
5(i.e., IQ scores) beyond the more widely accepted causal relationship—that cognitive
ability affects educational/academic performance.  Therefore, to the extent that there are
race–based subgroup differences in education level, these differences in education may
be manifested in measures of cognitive ability.
In terms of genetic explanations, Jensen (1985) supports Spearman's hypothesis
that African American–White test score differences are more pronounced on cognitive
ability (g) tests with speed of information processing postulated to be the mechanism
that results in the observed subgroup differences.  Furthermore, Rushton (2000)
espouses genetic explanations for racial test score differences by citing evidence for
smaller brain size, and consequently, slower information processing speed in African
Americans than Whites.  Rushton and Ankey (1996) present a qualitative review of the
literature on the relationship of brain size and cognitive ability in terms of race, age,
sex, and socioeconomic status variables.  The authors review research studies that
suggest the existence of a "race gradient" in which cognitive ability and brain size is
greater in East Asians than Europeans which in turn is greater than Africans.  The
authors provide several theories that would explain race differences in cognitive ability
and brain size; however, they do not present any empirical evidence that directly
support any of these theories.  Furthermore, these theories of subgroup differences have
been generally discounted and are not widely accepted (Helms, 1992; Zuckerman,
1990).
A third explanation for subgroup differences found in the personnel selection
and testing literature has focused on test bias (Arthur & Doverspike, 2003; Reynolds &
Brown, 1984; Sackett et al., 2001; Schmitt, 1989).  Specifically, this view posits that
6racial test score differences are artifactual and not real.  Sources of artifactual variance
include: the effects of test–taking skills that are not job relevant (Ryan & Greguras,
1998), the use of culture–specific language on the specified tests (Helms, 1992), and the
use of test formats (e.g., multiple–choice) that discriminate among subgroups via
processes of test perceptions or reading demands that are not job–related (Chan &
Schmitt, 1997; Ryan & Greguras, 1998).  
Prior to 1991, a common practice was to adjust scores to produce similar
subgroup distributions thereby eliminating test bias.  The reasoning behind this strategy
was that scores on specified tests represent different constructs for different subgroup
classifications.  Thus, a mean score of 80 on a test for one group was equivalent to an
85 or 90 for another group.  Therefore, tests were renormed within subgroups to equate
scores across subgroups.
Rank ordering candidates on the basis of predictor raw scores, specifically in the
presence of subgroup differences, will yield higher selection rates for the higher scoring
racial subgroup (e.g., Whites or males) resulting in adverse impact against the lower
scoring subgroup (e.g., African Americans or females).  However, subgroup differences
can be statistically removed by converting raw test scores to standard scores or
percentiles within each subgroup (i.e., subgroup norming) or by adding a constant to the
scores of the lower–scoring racial subgroups to eliminate systematic test score
differences.  The objective is to eliminate the difference in distributions as a function of
group membership so that individual candidates can be directly compared on the same
underlying distribution of scores (Sackett & Wilk, 1994).  Consequently, rank ordering
candidates using adjusted scores will equate selection ratios on the predictor, thereby
7eliminating adverse impact against specified subgroups of protected classes.  However,
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA, 1991) made the practice of any test score
adjustment on the basis of protected class variables illegal.  Since the ban on subgroup
or race norming and other adjustments to test scores on the basis of protected class
status (CRA, 1991), attempts to reduce adverse impact have taken one of two
approaches—the use of predictor constructs other than knowledge, skill, ability or
achievement with lower cognitive demands and the use of alternative testing methods.
Changing the Construct
Common noncognitive constructs that have been investigated in attempts to
reduce adverse impact have included personality variables (Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts,
1996) such as integrity (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Sackett & Wanek, 1996)
and conscientiousness (Schmitt et al., 1996).  Integrity has been examined as an
alternative predictor of job performance and generally displays no subgroup differences. 
Ones et al.'s (1993) meta–analysis of integrity test validities indicates that the best
estimate of the true mean correlation between integrity tests and supervisor ratings of
job performance is .41.  The relationship between integrity and counterproductive
behaviors (e.g., theft, absenteeism) is also quite high (i.e., .47), but moderated by
several methodological variables such as type of test (overt vs. personality–based) and
sample (applicants vs. incumbents).
Ones et al. (1993) reported large racial subgroup differences for overt integrity
tests (.72; nonminority mean was higher than the minority) and somewhat smaller mean
differences for personality–based integrity tests (.20).  However, several other
researchers (e.g., Sackett & Wanek, 1996; Terris & Jones, 1982) have failed to obtain
8subgroup differences in integrity test means between African Americans and Whites. 
For instance, Sackett and Wanek (1996) report that a reanalysis of integrity test mean
subgroup differences by Ones, Viswesvaran, and Schmidt (1996) failed to obtain any
racial subgroup differences.  Sackett and Wanek (1996) note that the large subgroup
differences reported by Ones et al. (1993) in their original meta–analysis were due to
computational errors.  Thus, the extant literature suggests that if integrity were used as
the sole predictor of job performance for selection, there would be no adverse impact
against African American applicants.
The Big Five personality dimensions are often used as alternatives to
knowledge, skill, ability and achievement in the prediction of job performance (Barrick
& Mount, 1991; Hurtz & Donovan, 2001). Correlations between the Big Five and
overall job performance reported in the literature typically range from .03 – .22 (Hurtz
& Donovan, 2001).  However, larger validities are reported between specific
components of each of the Big Five and specific facets of the job performance domain. 
For example, Hough (1992) reported an uncorrected correlation of -.38 between
Achievement (a component of the Conscientiousness construct) and counterproductive
behaviors.
Most of the empirical evidence indicates that measures of the Big Five
personality constructs do not typically yield racial subgroup differences (Hogan et al.,
1996; Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001; Sackett & Wilk, 1994).  Hough (1998)
computed standardized differences between racial subgroups using normative data
obtained from manuals of several commercially available personality tests.  African
American–White subgroup differences were minimal, ranging from ds of .00 to -.31. 
9The largest subgroup differences were reported for Affiliation (d = -.31) and
Intellectance (d = -.28) with African Americans scoring lower.  In contrast, African
Americans scored higher on Potency (d = .15).  Hispanic and White subgroup
standardized differences on the same personality scales were less than .10 with the
exception of Unlikely Virtues in which Hispanics scored higher (d = .60).  Hough et al.
(2001) report results similar to those described above.
Furthermore, Collins and Gleaves (1998), using confirmatory factor analysis,
found evidence that the five–factor model of personality fit equally well in a sample of
White and African American job applicants.  This research was in response to criticisms
that the Big Five factor structure is quite different for African Americans and
Whites—an issue that could have serious implications for the use of these noncognitive
predictors in selection contexts (Azibo, 1991; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). 
Finally, one study did report evidence of racial subgroup differences on two personality
variables which resulted in adverse impact at low selection ratios (Ryan, Ployhart, &
Friedal, 1998).  In summary, existing evidence suggests there are minimal to no racial
subgroup differences on most job–relevant personality constructs.
In terms of criterion–related validities, Barrick and Mount (1991) found
conscientiousness to have the strongest relationship to job performance, with
correlations ranging from .20 to .23.  In addition, Hurtz and Donovan's (2001)
meta–analysis obtained a true estimated correlation of .20 between conscientiousness
and overall job performance.  That is, of all the Big Five factors, the highest "true"
population correlation appears to be around .20, which in terms of practical
significance, represents a small amount of explained variance (i.e., 4%) in job
10
performance.  For instance, in terms of Cohen's (1992) rules of thumb (i.e., small = .10,
medium = .30, large = .50 and Hemphill's (2003) empirical guidelines (i.e., small =
<.20, medium = .20 to .30, large = >.30) for interpreting correlational effect sizes, the
strongest population correlation between personality and job performance can best be
described as small to medium.  In contrast, the predictive validity of other constructs
such as knowledge, skill, ability, achievement, and training and experience is much
higher (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Therefore, although there appears to be an absence of
subgroup differences, one could conclude that the criterion–related validity of
personality variables may not be strong enough to warrant what at present, appears to
be their increasing use in selection contexts and the extant literature.  In addition, a
number of researchers (e.g., Arthur, Woehr, & Graziano, 2001; Ryan et al., 1998) have
raised several overlooked issues in the application of personality variables in personnel
selection contexts and provide some compelling reasons to carefully consider these
issues when using personality tests in selection and other organizational
decision–making contexts.
Other noncognitive constructs that have been proposed are practical intelligence
and tacit knowledge (Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002; Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, &
Horvarth, 1995).  Practical intelligence refers to common sense or "street smarts" as
opposed to "book smarts" which is represented by cognitive ability or traditional
intelligence.  Tacit knowledge is defined as "action–oriented knowledge, acquired
without direct help from others, that allows individuals to achieve goals they personally
value" (p. 916, Sternberg et al., 1995).  Sternberg et al. (1995) review empirical studies
that support the validity of these constructs in predicting various outcomes such as job
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performance.  In addition, they emphasize that these constructs are distinctly different
from traditional intelligence (e.g., operationalized as I.Q.) and that the correlation
between these two constructs is zero.  Finally, they argue that there are no race–based
subgroup differences in practical intelligence or tacit knowledge.  For example, they
cited one study (i.e., Eddy, 1988) that reported a .03 correlation between race and tacit
knowledge.  Thus, they conclude that this construct is a viable alternative to traditional
cognitively loaded constructs for resolving the organizational dilemma.
In summary, many of the noncognitive predictor constructs proposed as
alternatives to knowledge, skill, ability and achievement have been found to be related
to job performance to some degree; but, with the exception of integrity, the correlations
are substantially lower than those for the relationship between cognitively loaded
constructs and performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  And, although subgroup
differences have been shown to be lower on some of these constructs (e.g., personality;
Hogan et al., 1996; Schmitt, et al., 1996), the use of noncognitive predictor constructs in
reducing adverse impact has generally not been very successful (Ryan et al., 1998) and
the lower validity resulting from the use of these constructs may result in a considerable
reduction in utility (Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Schmitt, Rogers, Chan, Sheppard, &
Jennings, 1997).
Combining Constructs
A variation of the approach of using noncognitive predictor constructs is to
combine cognitively loaded constructs with other predictors (e.g., personality
variables).  The intent is to combine the high validity of paper–and–pencil tests of
knowledge, skill, ability and achievement with the low subgroup differences often
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observed with noncognitive predictors to create a composite selection battery that
solves the organizational dilemma of coming up with valid predictors with low levels of
adverse impact.  Thus, researchers have looked at optimal combinations of predictors
(Pulakos & Schmitt, 1996; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997; Sackett & Roth, 1996; Schmitt et
al., 1997) and criteria (i.e., different facets of job performance; Hattrup, Rock, & Scalia,
1997) in an attempt to reduce adverse impact and minimize the loss of selection utility.
A few studies that examined the approach of combining cognitively loaded
constructs with other predictors documented an enhancement in the validity of the
selection battery and simultaneous reductions in adverse impact (Ones et al., 1993;
Pulakos & Schmitt, 1996).  Pulakos and Schmitt (1996) examined the predictive
validity and subgroup differences in a multi–predictor battery that consisted of biodata,
a situational judgement test, a structured interview, and a paper–and–pencil and
video–based verbal ability test. They found that validity was enhanced with the use of
biodata, the situational judgement test, and the structured interview in combination with
the verbal ability test and that subgroup differences were minimized.  However, the
80% rule was still violated unless the verbal ability test was omitted from the selection
battery.  Furthermore, structured interviews and situational judgement tests are methods
and the authors only implied that they measured noncognitive predictor constructs,
without indicating which constructs were measured.
Ones et al. (1993) found evidence for the incremental validity of integrity tests
over cognitive ability.  Specifically, they estimated that integrity tests, when combined
with cognitive ability increased the multiple validity correlation by 22% – 100% over
using cognitive ability alone depending on the level of job complexity.  Furthermore,
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Schmidt and Hunter (1998) reported a 27% increase in the prediction of job
performance using integrity in conjunction with cognitive ability.  However, Schmidt
and Hunter did not address the issue of adverse impact using various predictor
combinations.
Hattrup et al. (1997) examined validities and levels of adverse impact of a
predictor composite while differentially weighting performance criteria.  Specifically,
they investigated the predictive validity of cognitive ability and work orientation for
task and contextual performance in a Monte Carlo investigation of optimal weighting
strategies for performance criteria.  Hattrup et al. (1997) made the distinction between
task and contextual performance and examined subgroup differences on the predictors
given different weights applied to the criterion dimensions.  As expected, cognitive
ability was more related to task performance and work orientation was more related to
contextual performance.  Since work orientation is associated with less adverse impact,
it was expected that weighting contextual performance higher on measures of job
performance would weight the low impact predictor—work orientation—higher and
yield less adverse impact in the predictor combination.  However, the authors showed
that a violation of the 80% rule was found at every selection ratio unless contextual
performance was weighted five times higher than task performance, which would be
highly unlikely in operational settings.
Although additional noncognitive constructs can add incremental validity
beyond cognitive constructs (Ones et al., 1993; Schmitt et al., 1997), the empirical
evidence suggests that combining cognitive predictors with these alternative predictors
does not necessarily eliminate subgroup differences for a large range of selection ratios. 
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The consequences of adding alternative predictor constructs can vary widely and is
based on many factors such as test validities, predictor intercorrelations, cutoff scores,
specific stage of the selection process they are used, and selection ratios (Bobko et al.,
1999; Huffcutt & Roth, 1998; Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Roth, Bobko, Switzer, & Dean,
2001; Roth, Van Iddekinge, Huffcutt, Eidson, & Bobko, 2002; Sackett & Ellingson,
1997; Sackett & Roth, 1996; Schmitt et al., 1997).  Therefore, one can conclude that it
is difficult to enhance the validity of selection batteries while simultaneously reducing
levels of adverse impact by simply using noncognitive predictors in combination with
cognitively loaded predictors (Hough & Oswald, 2000; Hough et al., 2001; Ryan et al.,
1998).
Changing the Method
The second approach to reducing adverse impact recognizes that
paper–and–pencil tests of knowledge, skill, ability and achievement are the most valid
predictors of job performance but posits that racial subgroup differences on knowledge,
skill, ability and achievement may partially arise from the mode or method of
testing—specifically, paper–and–pencil multiple–choice tests—instead of the construct
(Schmitt et al., 1996).  Specifically, it is argued that the mode of testing influences test
scores when it is not related to the criterion of interest (i.e., job or school performance;
Ryan & Greguras, 1998).  That is, racial test score differences are artifactual and result
from contaminated predictor scores.  Sources of artifactual variance include: the effects
of test–taking skills that are not job related (Ryan & Greguras, 1998), the use of
culture–specific language on the specified tests (Helms, 1992), and the use of test
formats (e.g., multiple–choice) that discriminate among subgroups via processes of test
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perceptions or reading demands that are not job related (Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Ryan &
Greguras, 1998).  Therefore, proponents of this theory of subgroup differences advocate
the use of alternative testing formats such as video–based testing, job simulations,
performance tests, and structured interviews that are not contaminated by job–irrelevant
constructs such as reading load, susceptibility to testwiseness cues, or test perceptions.
A primary limitation of the extant literature is that it has often failed to draw a
clear distinction between the method used to operationalize the construct and content
(the construct measured) and the two have typically been confounded (Arthur et al.,
2002; Chan, 1997; Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Schmitt et al., 1996).  Schmitt et al. (1996)
reviewed the literature on sex and race differences for some predictors of job
performance such as spatial, verbal, and math abilities, job samples, interviews, and
personality variables.  They concluded that there was little research examining the
effects of altering test methods on subgroup differences for job–relevant predictor
constructs.  In fact, they indicated that the results are difficult to interpret because the
methodology used in most studies examining alternate predictors of job performance
confounded the constructs and methods used to measure those constructs.  That is, it is
difficult to determine from the extant literature whether it is the alternate constructs that
lower levels of adverse impact or alternate methods.
Content refers to the constructs and variables (e.g., conscientiousness, cognitive
ability, finger dexterity, field dependence–independence, reaction time, and visual
attention) that are being measured, and method refers to the techniques or procedures
(e.g., graphology, paper–and–pencil tests, computer–administered tests, video–based
tests, interviews, and simulations) that we use to accomplish the measurement of the
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specified content (Arthur et al., 2003; Arthur et al., 2002; Campbell, 1990).  From a
methodological perspective, specified comparisons of different test formats should hold
constructs constant and vary methods.  For instance, if the levels of adverse impact for
performance tests and paper–and–pencil multiple–choice tests are to be compared, then
to obtain interpretable results, both test formats should be measuring the same
construct.  A comparison of paper–and–pencil measures of cognitive ability and work
samples may not be meaningful if the constructs differ (Arthur et al., 2003; Arthur et
al., 2002; Chan, 1997; Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Guion, 1998).  Schmitt et al. (1996)
found only one, albeit unpublished, study (Goldstein, Braverman, & Chung, 1992) that
examined subgroup differences using different methods to measure the same constructs
and called for more research using this methodology to examine subgroup differences
on alternative testing methods.  Since the Schmitt et al. review, we have found five
studies (Arthur et al., 2002; Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Richman–Hirsch, Olsen–Buchanan,
& Drasgow, 2000; Schmitt & Mills, 2001; Pulakos & Schmitt, 1996) that examined
alternative testing methods holding the construct or content constant.
Pulakos and Schmitt (1996) represents an attempt at reducing subgroup
differences by changing the method and holding the construct constant by measuring
verbal ability and changing the method of measurement in a multi–predictor test
battery.  They argued that video–based testing more accurately reflects the cognitive
demands encountered on the job.  To test this theory, they compared scores on a
traditional paper–and–pencil multiple–choice test and two job sample exercises.  One
job sample was a simulation of activities and tasks that would be encountered on a
federal investigative job presented in a video–based format and participants were to
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write an essay describing the activities they viewed in each simulation.  The second job
sample was a health fraud simulation in which participants were to write an essay
documenting allegations of fraud by a doctor's patients.  The health fraud simulation
required participants to read written text describing allegations of fraud and procedures
authorized by the accused doctor.  African American–White subgroup differences were
lower on the video–based administration (.45; Whites scored higher than African
Americans) than on the written text medical fraud simulation (.91) and the
multiple–choice test (1.03).  Hispanic–White subgroup differences were also lower on
the video–based administration (.37; Whites scored higher than Hispanics) than on the
written text medical fraud simulation (.52), and the multiple–choice test (.78).  The
lower subgroup differences translated into lower levels of adverse impact against
minorities for the video–based verbal ability test; however, the hiring rates based on the
video administration alone still violated the 80% rule for African Americans at selection
ratios of .60 and lower and for Hispanics at selection ratios of .40 and lower.
Chan and Schmitt (1997) compared subgroup differences on a video–based and
written situational judgement test of work habits and interpersonal skills.  They also
examined participants' reports of the face validity of each test format and differences in
reading comprehension as possible explanations for why subgroup differences were
lower on video–based test formats.  They found that performance on the video–based
test was substantially higher than performance on the paper–and–pencil test, indicating
that higher fidelity tests tend to yield increases in test performance for all participants. 
Furthermore, African American–White differences in test performance were also
substantially smaller on the video–based test (d = .21; Whites scored higher than
18
African Americans) compared to the paper–and–pencil test (d = .95).  Additionally,
when reading comprehension was controlled, there was a significant decease (i.e., 3%
of the variance) in the race–test performance relationship.  Finally, Whites reported
higher levels of face validity for the paper–and–pencil test than African Americans (d =
.80; Whites scored higher than African Americans), but that difference was significantly
less for the video–based test (d = .11).  Face validity accounted for a unique portion of
the variance in subgroup differences (i.e., 3%) beyond that accounted for by reading
comprehension.
Richman–Hirsch et al. (2000) compared three test methods that measured the
same content for differences in examinees' perceptions (i.e., perceived fairness and face
validity) and attitudes (i.e., enjoyment, shortness, satisfaction, and modernization). 
Participants reported more positive perceptions and attitudes towards the computerized,
video–based multimedia version of a test that contained scenarios depicting workplace
conflict as opposed to the written version of the same scenarios administered via a
computer page–turner and paper–and–pencil formats.  Participants perceived the
computerized multimedia version to have more content and predictive validity and to be
more job–related than the computer page–turner and paper–and–pencil formats.  Their
results suggest that newer, technologically advanced methods (e.g., computerized
multi–media, video–based) of measuring valid constructs (i.e., cognitive ability) are
viewed more favorably by examinees than written versions (e.g., paper–and–pencil,
computerized page–turner tests).
Schmitt and Mills (2001) demonstrated that scores on a computerized job
simulation yielded lower African American–White test score differences (d = .30;
19
Whites scored higher) than a paper–and–pencil test (d = .61) measuring similar
constructs.  However, the computerized job simulation test had lower criterion–related
validity (corrected r = .36) than the paper–and–pencil test (corrected r = .46). 
Furthermore, when the selection ratio was relatively low, the job simulation test still
violated the 80% rule for adverse impact.  Thus, although the job simulation method
showed promising results as a viable alternative to traditional paper–and–pencil test
formats, it did not completely eliminate the dilemma for personnel researchers and
practitioners of finding a low adverse impact predictor with high criterion–related
validity.
The evidence from the four studies reviewed above suggests that we can still use
cognitive ability to select individuals into a wide variety of jobs, and also reduce racial
subgroup differences when we use high fidelity testing formats such as multi–media
presentations, performance tests, and job simulations.  However, multi–media testing
and job simulations have lower economic utility because they require more resources to
develop (e.g., producing high–fidelity multi–media simulations and programming
computer software), administer, and score (Chan & Schmitt, 1997).  In addition to
lower economic utility, applicant safety and a company's legal liability in the event of
an accident also lowers the utility of performance tests (Hoffman & Thornton, 1997;
Smither, Reilly, Millsap, Pearlman, & Stoffy, 1993; Weekley & Jones, 1997). 
Therefore, paper–and–pencil tests clearly have an advantage over performance tests and
video–based or computerized testing, but the difficulty is constructing them to retain
their advantages (e.g., mass administration, fewer required resources for administration
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and scoring) and still minimize the alleged test bias typically associated with this
methodology (Pulakos & Schmitt, 1996).
More recently, Arthur et al. (2002) compared multiple–choice and constructed
response test formats that measured the same Fire Battalion Chief field management
decision making abilities.  Arthur et al. compared scores on a multiple–choice test to a
constructed response test (write–in and mark–in format) in a within–subjects design and
obtained a reduction of race–based subgroup differences on the constructed response
format.  Specifically, African American–White score differences and subsequent levels
of adverse impact were lower for the constructed response (d = .12; Whites scored
higher on the test) than the multiple–choice test (d = .70).  In fact, the 80% rule for
adverse impact was not violated with the constructed response format using any of the
six different cutoff scores examined.  In contrast, the 80% rule was violated in three of
the six cutoff scores on the multiple–choice test.  Finally, these results were also
replicated using between–subjects data.
Multiple–Choice vs. Constructed Response Tests
Multiple–choice tests consist of an item stem and a set of alternatives from
which to choose the correct answer to the stem.  The advantages of multiple–choice
tests include (a) the ability to administer the test to large numbers of people in one test
administration, (b) they are relatively inexpensive to develop, administer, and score, (c)
scoring is considered to be objective, and (d) a broad content domain can be represented
on the test.  In contrast, a constructed response format "is any question requiring the
examinee to generate an answer rather than select from a small set of options" (p. 2,
Bennett, 1993).
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The item format of multiple–choice tests is fairly consistent, with only minor
variations in stems and number of alternatives across tests.  For example, stems may be
written in question, sentence completion, or fill–in–the–blank form and the number of
alternatives often ranges from two to five.  In contrast, there is a broad range of
constructed response item types that is defined by the degree of constraint on responses
to the items.  They can be defined along a continuum of constrained item types from
sentence completion, to short answer (from one sentence to a short paragraph), to
relatively unconstrained multi–page essays.  Constructed response item formats are not
commonly used in personnel selection but are seen more frequently in educational
settings.  However, given burgeoning objections to multiple–choice tests in high–stakes
testing, constructed response formats may be a viable alternative.  Indications of this
orientation are seen in the emergent use of constructed response items on college
admissions tests such as the SAT, GRE (Educational Testing Service, 2001a, 2001b),
and GMAT (Graduate Management Admission Council, 2002) which now have writing
assessment sections.
The problem however, is that by their very nature, constructed response tests are
likely to produce less reliable scores and are also inherently more expensive to
administer and score.  For example, Bennett (1993) notes that "the costs of adding a
single essay to a large–scale admissions testing program are about three to five times
the cost of a 150–200–question multiple–choice test" (p. 11).  Therefore, the challenge
is to develop constructed response tests to retain the advantages of multiple–choice tests
and ensure the construct equivalence of the two formats.  Arthur et al. (2002)
successfully developed a constructed response test with all four advantages of the
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multiple–choice tests referred to above by using standard item–writing rules and a
content–related validity approach.  Arthur et al. argued that the two test formats
measured the same construct since both tests were developed from the same content
domain using a content–related validity approach.  However, based on evidence that
multiple–choice tests are often contaminated by other constructs (e.g., reading ability,
test–taking skills) that are unrelated to job performance, it is not expected that the
alternate form correlations will be unity.
As previously noted, Arthur et al. (2002) obtained a reduction in African
American–White test score differences on a constructed response test compared to a
multiple–choice test measuring identical content.  However, Arthur et al. describe their
data as suggestive due to the small sample sizes (N = 27 for the within–subjects data; N
= 51 for the between–subjects data) and because the data were from an operational
promotional exam in which the collection of non–operational research data or
assignment to conditions was not possible.  Thus, although Arthur et al. showed a
reduction in subgroup differences and lower levels of subsequent adverse impact for
their constructed response test, they provided no empirical data explaining these effects. 
However, as they discussed, there are several plausible reasons for the reduction in
subgroup differences.  Specifically, the use of constructed response tests may be
associated with lower non–job–related reading load, lower susceptibility to testwiseness
cues, and more favorable test perceptions than multiple–choice tests.  Thus, in a
replication of Arthur et al's findings, it was expected that:
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H1: African American–White subgroup differences on the constructed
response test will be smaller than African American–White subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test.
As previously noted, the use of constructed response tests may be associated
with lower non–job–related reading load, lower susceptibility to test–taking skills, and
more favorable test perceptions than multiple–choice tests.  The next section reviews
each of these factors, establishing the conceptual basis for the hypothesized subgroup
differences and test–format effects.
Reading Ability
In contrast to performance tests, the medium of information exchange for
paper–and–pencil tests is via means of reading text and responding accordingly.  To the
extent that reading ability is not concomitant with job demands and/or performance, any
variance associated with reading ability is considered to be error variance.  That is,
reading ability may be unrelated to job performance so that the measurement of reading
ability in conjunction with job–relevant constructs (e.g., cognitive ability) reduces the
construct validity of a selection or promotional test.  Furthermore, to the extent that
some evidence suggests the presence of racial subgroup differences in reading ability,
then the reading load of the test medium (e.g., paper–and–pencil tests) may explain
some of the variance in African American–White differences on test scores (Chan &
Schmitt, 1997; Sacco, Scheu, Ryan, Schmitt, Schmidt, & Rogg, 2000).  Indeed, the
basic argument for the use of alternative test formats such as performance tests, job
simulations, and tests with video–based presentation is that these tests have little or no
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reading demands which translates into lower race–based subgroup differences (Chan &
Schmitt, 1997; Schmitt & Mills, 2001).
Arthur et al. (2002) documented that the multiple–choice test used in their study
contained 1,808 more words, 307 more sentences, and two more words per sentence
than the constructed response test with comparable Flesch–Kincaid grade levels (10.99
for the multiple–choice and 10.50 for the constructed response). The observed
differences in reading demands can clearly be attributed to the absence of alternatives
on the constructed response test.  Thus, the present study investigated differential
reading loads as an explanatory variable for observed subgroup differences on an
achievement test.  Specifically, the reading load of a multiple–choice test is higher than
a stem–equivalent constructed response test (Arthur et al., 2002).  Consequently, it was
expected that there will be a stronger relationship between reading ability and
multiple–choice test performance than with constructed response test performance. 
Furthermore, based on the extant literature it was also expected that there would be
subgroup differences in reading ability.  Thus, when reading ability differences are
controlled by using a constructed response test, race differences in test performance will
be reduced or disappear.
H2a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between reading ability
and test performance.
H2b: There will be a significant relationship between reading ability and test
format.  Specifically, the reading ability/multiple–choice relationship
will be stronger than the reading ability/constructed response
relationship.
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H2c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
on reading ability.
H2d: Reading ability will partially mediate the relationship between race and
test performance such that when controlled, subgroup differences on the
multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.
Test–Taking Skills
It is widely recognized that performance on multiple–choice tests is influenced
by the presence of testwiseness cues (Fagley, 1987; Millman, Bishop, & Ebel, 1965;
Sarnacki, 1979; Traub, 1993).  Millman et al. (1965) provided the first taxonomy to
describe the construct of testwiseness which has served as the basis for the subsequent
measurement and research of testwiseness.  Testwiseness is defined as ". . . a subject's
capacity to utilize the characteristics and formats of the test and/or the test taking
situation to receive a high score.  Testwiseness is logically independent of the
examinee's knowledge of the subject matter for which the items are supposedly
measures." (p. 707, Millman et al., 1965).
Both multiple–choice and constructed response tests are susceptible to
test–taking skills, but the type of skills used on each test are very different.  For
example, essays require a test taker to generate a logical, clear, and concise response to
the question using strategies specific to this test format.  In contrast, test–taking skills
used on multiple–choice tests typically involve the identification of correct alternatives
by using secondary cues that would make the alternative attractive in the absence of
knowledge of the test content.  Examples of secondary cues include direct and indirect
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clues such as lengthy correct alternatives, specific, unrelated, or absurd distractors that
may be quickly eliminated, and carefully bounded qualifiers in the correct alternative. 
The specific type of test–taking skills examined in the present study are those that are
associated with multiple–choice tests.
Test–taking skills have been measured by asking test takers to describe the
strategies they use on the tests.  These statements are then coded by experimenters into
categories and given a score to represent the total number of strategies used and the
relative effectiveness of the strategies (Bruch, 1981).  Another method is to have test
takers endorse items on a checklist describing various test–taking strategies used on a
test such as a subsample of those outlined by Millman et al. (1965).  One of the more
common approaches to measuring test–taking skills is to develop multiple–choice items
measuring content that would be unknown to the average person, but that may be
answered correctly when applying basic test–taking strategies (e.g., Bajtelsmit, 1975;
Gibb, 1964; Woodley, 1973).  Gibb's (1964) 70–item Experimental Test of
Testwiseness was developed using this methodology and is generally considered to be
the most comprehensive measure of test–taking skills with the best psychometric
properties (Harmon, Morse, & Morse, 1996; Miller, Fagley, & Lane, 1988; Miller,
Fuqua, & Fagley, 1990).
The literature clearly indicates that test–taking skills are highly trainable and
meta–analyses comparing groups trained in test–taking skills to control groups show an
improvement in test scores from .1 to .2 standard deviations for the trained groups
(Bangert–Drowns, Kulik, & Kulik, 1983; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981; Powers, 1993;
Samson, 1985).  This capacity for examinees to develop test–taking strategies is the
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basis for the success of coaching to increase standardized test scores (e.g., Princeton
and Kaplan Reviews; Bargent–Drowns et al., 1983; Dolly & Williams, 1986; Millman
et al., 1965; Samson, 1985).  Test–taking skills have also been associated with
testing–taking experience.  It stands to reason that those individuals with more
test–taking experience are likely to have developed more effective test–taking
strategies, are more comfortable taking tests, have more positive reactions toward the
testing experience, may feel less anxiety during testing situations, and will spend less
time reading familiar, standardized instructions (Sarnacki, 1979).
There are very few studies examining race–based subgroup differences in
test–taking skills.  Comparisons of Americans to Indonesian and Chinese students show
a distinct advantage in test–taking skills exhibited by the American students (Lo &
Slakter, 1973; Millman & Setijadi, 1966; Wu & Slakter, 1978).  In contrast, several
studies examining subgroup differences between racial groups within the United States
have found no African American–White differences in test–taking skills (Benson,
Urman, & Hocevar, 1986; Diamond, Ayres, Fishman, & Green, 1976; Rogers & Yang,
1996) despite claims that this variable may explain some of the variance in race
differences (Helms, 1992; Kalechstein, Kalechstein, & Doctor, 1981).  Ellis and Ryan
(1999) provided evidence that African Americans reported the use of more ineffective
test–taking strategies than Whites, but there were no differences for effective
test–taking strategies.  Two possible explanations for hypothesized race differences in
test–taking skills is that Whites are more experienced with taking multiple–choice tests
or that Whites are more likely to enroll in professional test coaching programs (e.g., the
Princeton Review).  However, Ellis and Ryan (1999) reported higher rates of
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participation in test coaching programs in a sample of African Americans compared to
Whites which would preclude hypothesizing that differences in training may explain the
African American–White differences in test scores.
Test–taking skills are typically associated with the use of multiple–choice tests
and is related only to the testing format and not the construct being measured by the
test.  In addition, evidence shows that test–taking skills influences test performance and
since these skills are not related to job demands, any variance associated with this
extraneous variable is considered error variance.  To the extent that there are subgroup
differences in test–taking skills this variable may explain some of the variance in
African American–White performance differences on multiple–choice tests.
Given the paucity of research examining race differences in test–taking skills,
the present study explored this variable as a possible explanation for a reduction in
African American–White differences on a constructed response test.  The limited
evidence indicates that African Americans and Whites do not differ in test–taking skills,
but hypotheses were presented in the direction of the other variables in the study. 
Specifically, multiple–choice tests are more susceptible to testwiseness cues, so it was
expected that there will be a stronger relationship between test–taking skills and
multiple–choice test performance than with constructed response test performance. 
Next, it was expected that there will be African American–White subgroup differences
on test–taking skills.  Finally, it was expected that when differences in test–taking skills
are controlled by using a constructed response test, race differences in test performance
will be reduced.
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H3a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between susceptibility to
testwiseness and test performance.
H3b: There will be a significant relationship between susceptibility to
testwiseness and test format.  Specifically, the test–taking
skills/multiple–choice relationship will be stronger than the test–taking
skills/constructed response relationship.
H3c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
in test–taking skills.
H3d: Test–taking skills will partially mediate the relationship between race
and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup differences on
the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.
Test Perceptions
The influence of examinee perceptions on test performance has been
increasingly studied in the last 15 years (Ryan & Ployhart, 2000) and driven by findings
that various perceptions (e.g., face validity) are related to real outcomes such as test
performance or decision to withdraw from the job application process.  It is important to
note that Smither et al. (1993) indicated that reactions to test characteristics such as face
validity are very important to consider in personnel selection because they may
influence (a) perceived organizational attractiveness or the likelihood that someone
accepts a job offer, (b) the potential for legal action, and (c) test performance through
decreased motivation and absence of qualified applicants.  Some researchers have
posited that racial differences in standardized test performance can be attributed to
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subgroup differences in face validity, perceived fairness, perceived predictive validity,
belief in tests, stereotype threat, and self–efficacy (Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Chan,
Schmitt, DeShon, Clause, & Delbridge, 1997; Gilliland, 1994; Ryan, 2001; Steele,
1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
Ryan (2001) provides the most comprehensive review of the testing literature
that attempts to explain race–based test score differences on cognitively loaded tests
through processes of test perceptions.  She presents a model in which test perceptions
can indirectly influence test performance via cognitions, affect, or motivation during
test administration.  It is posited that negative perceptions introduce test–irrelevant
cognitions, negative affect, and lowered motivation that detract from test–relevant
behaviors or cognitions associated with increased test performance (Ryan, 2001).
The following section reviews specific test perceptions hypothesized to
influence test performance.  Where pertinent, the review also summarizes specified
relationships among the test perceptions as suggested by the literature.  However, for
the purposes of this study, hypotheses are limited to only the relationship between the
specified perception variables and the race/test performance relationship.  Nevertheless,
inter–relations between the perception variables were assessed and reported.
Face Validity
One of the most common test reactions measured in the testing literature is the
perceived face validity of the test (Chan et al., 1997; Smither et al., 1993).  Face
validity refers to perceptions of the extent to which a test "looks like" it is measuring
what it is supposed to be measuring.  Some advantages of using face valid tests are that
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they are associated with smaller subgroup differences, more positive reactions from
examinees, and are also legally more defensible (Chan et al., 1997).
Ryan (2001) suggested that face validity could interfere with test performance
via a withdrawal of effort, increased anger, and decreased self–efficacy.  However, most
studies examining this variable have measured the relationship of reactions to the tests
and post–test applicant behaviors rather than the relationship between pretest face
validity and test performance.  One exception is Chan et al. (1997), who administered
parallel forms of a cognitive ability test and measured perceptions of face validity and
test–taking motivation between administrations.  They found that perceptions of face
validity and motivation were significantly related to performance on the second test.
Most research examining race differences in face validity of different selection
tests has focused on the face validity of the construct, rather than the test format (Ryan
& Greguras, 1998).  Of the limited research on face validity perceptions of test format,
studies show that applicants generally perceive performance tests, job simulations, and
video–based tests to be more job–related and fair than traditional paper–and–pencil
tests (Chan et al., 1997; Schmidt, Greenthal, Hunter, Berner, & Seaton, 1977; Schmitt
& Mills, 2001).  For example, Chan et al. (1997) showed that test–takers perceived
video–based tests to be more face valid than paper–and–pencil tests.
Evidence that face validity mediates the relationship between race and test
performance has been empirically documented.  For instance, Schmitt and Mills (2001)
report smaller race differences on a job simulation than a traditional paper–and–pencil
test and concluded that the job simulation was perceived to be more face valid.  Chan
and Schmitt (1997) compared a paper–and–pencil and video–based format on the same
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situational judgement test and found the largest subgroup differences in face validity on
the paper–and pencil test (Whites reported higher levels of face validity than African
Americans).  These studies compared performance tests and job simulations to
traditional paper–and–pencil tests, but test–takers may even distinguish different
paper–and–pencil test formats in terms of specific test perceptions (Outtz, 1998).
There is enough evidence (e.g., Outtz, 1998) to suggest that multiple–choice and
constructed response formats differ in terms of face validity perceptions.  Thus, the
present study investigated face validity as a possible explanation for observed subgroup
differences on an achievement test.  Specifically, participants should report lower levels
of face validity on the multiple–choice compared to the constructed response test. 
Consequently, it was expected that there will be a stronger relationship between face
validity and multiple–choice test performance than with constructed response test
performance.  Furthermore, it was expected that there will be African American–White
subgroup differences in face validity.  Thus, when differences in face validity
perceptions are controlled by using a constructed response test, race differences in test
performance will be reduced.
H4a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between face validity
and test performance.
H4b: There will be a significant relationship between face validity and test
format.  Specifically, the face validity/multiple–choice relationship will
be stronger than the face validity/constructed response relationship.
H4c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
in face validity
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H4d: Face validity will partially mediate the relationship between race and test
performance such that when controlled, subgroup differences on the
multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.
Fairness
Organizational justice theories are a useful framework to help explain applicant
reactions to employment selection systems.  Specifically, the perceived fairness of
selection systems may be evaluated in terms of distributive and procedural justice
(Gilliland, 1993; 1994).  The majority of research examining the relationship between
fairness and reactions to selection systems has typically examined post–test reactions
and their influence on post–test behaviors such as recommendation intentions
(Gilliland, 1994; Smither et al., 1993), acceptance intention (Macan, Avedon, Paese, &
Smith, 1994) and withdrawal from the selection process (Schmit & Ryan, 1997).  In
general, the results of this research suggests that job applicants who perceive an overall
selection system to be unfair will be less likely to recommend the employer to others or
to accept a job offer, and they are also more likely to withdraw from the selection
process.
Fairness may be related to performance on a specific test within a selection
system.  For example, tests perceived as unfair may result in a withdrawal of effort by
the applicant.  Some recent research in the area of applicant perceptions has examined
the relationship between applicant pretest fairness perceptions and performance on
cognitively loaded tests with somewhat mixed results.  In terms of practical
significance, fairness perceptions appear to account for only a small amount of variance
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in test performance.  For example, Chan, Schmitt, Sacco, and Deshon (1998) reported a
small relationship between pretest fairness perceptions and average performance on
three paper–and–pencil cognitive ability tests (mean r = .23).  Macon et al. (1994)
obtained a similar relationship (r = .21) between perceptions of fairness and an ability
test battery.  Finally, Ryan, Sacco, McFarland, and Kriska (2000) obtained an even
smaller correlation between fairness and test performance (r = .10).
The literature suggests that African American–White subgroup differences on
fairness perceptions may also be quite small.  For example, Chan et al. (1998) obtained
an African American–White standardized difference of d = .24 (Whites perceived the
tests as being more fair) on three paper–and–pencil cognitive ability tests and Ryan et
al. (2000) reported an African American–White difference of  d = .18 on an ability test. 
Nevertheless, fairness perceptions were examined in the present study as a possible
explanation for observed subgroup differences on an achievement test.  Specifically, it
was anticipated that participants will report lower perceptions of fairness on the
multiple–choice compared to the constructed response test.  Consequently, it was
expected that there will be a stronger relationship between fairness perceptions and
multiple–choice test performance than with constructed response test performance. 
Next, it was expected that there will be African American–White subgroup differences
in fairness perceptions.  Finally, when differences in fairness perceptions are controlled
by using a constructed response test, race differences in test performance will be
reduced.
H5a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between fairness
perceptions and test performance.
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H5b: There will be a significant relationship between fairness perceptions and
test format.  Specifically, the fairness perceptions/multiple–choice
relationship will be stronger than the fairness perceptions/constructed
response relationship.
H5c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
in fairness perceptions.
H5d: Fairness perceptions will partially mediate the relationship between race
and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup differences on
the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.
Perceived Predictive Validity
Perceived predictive validity refers to a test–taker's perception of how well test
performance predicts future job performance.  Smither et al. (1993) found evidence that
perceptions of predictive validity of a selection procedure affects outcomes such as the
willingness to recommend a company to others one month after completion of an
employment examination.  Other researchers contend that perceptions of predictive
validity may influence test performance (Cascio, 1987; Chan et al. 1997) and Chan et
al. (1997, 1998) hypothesized that this relationship is mediated by motivation to
perform on the test.  That is, low levels of perceived predictive validity may be
associated with lower levels of test–taking motivation which directly influences test
performance.
Several researchers have failed to find substantial race differences in the
perceived predictive validity of cognitively loaded tests (Chan et al. 1998; Horvath,
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Ryan, & Steirwalt, 2000; Smither et al. 1993).  In one exception, Chan (1997) found an
African American–White standardized difference of d = .36 with Whites reporting
higher predictive validity perceptions than African Americans on a paper–and–pencil
cognitive ability test.  However, Chan (1997) reported that the difference in predictive
validity perceptions accounted for only a small reduction in performance differences
(change in d = .03).
No research studies have compared the perceived predictive validity associated
with two different paper–and–pencil test formats.  Therefore, the present study
examined the role of perceived predictive validity as a partial explanation for observed
subgroup differences on an achievement test.  Specifically, it was anticipated that
participants will report lower levels of perceived predictive validity on the
multiple–choice compared to the constructed response test.  Consequently, it was
expected that there will be a stronger relationship between perceived predictive validity
and the multiple–choice test performance than with constructed response test
performance.  Next, it was expected that there will be African American–White
subgroup differences in perceived predictive validity.  Finally, when differences in
perceived predictive validity are controlled by using a constructed response test, racial
subgroup differences in test performance will be reduced.
H6a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between perceived
predictive validity and test performance.
H6b: There will be a significant relationship between perceived predictive
validity and test format.  Specifically, the perceived predictive
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validity/multiple–choice relationship will be stronger than the perceived
predictive validity/constructed response relationship.
H6c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
in perceived predictive validity.
H6d: Perceived predictive validity will partially mediate the relationship
between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels
observed for the constructed response test.
Belief in Tests
Belief in tests is relevant to personnel testing because it refers to the strength of
the belief that tests are valid indicators of job performance (Arvey, Strickland, Drauden,
& Martin, 1990; Chan et al., 1998; Lounsbury, Bobrow, & Jensen, 1989; Ryan, 2001;
Schmit & Ryan, 1992).  This variable differs from the other perceptions reviewed in
that it is a belief about all personnel selection tests and is not in reference to a specific
test.  Chan et al. (1998) showed that belief in tests has an indirect relationship with test
performance through test characteristics such as face validity, perceived predictive
validity, and fairness.  However, Schmit and Ryan (1998) found no relationship
between belief in tests and test performance.
The present study investigated belief in tests as a possible explanation for
observed subgroup differences on an achievement test.  Participants in the present study
were informed that they would take a standardized achievement test similar to the ACT
(American College Testing, 2002) exam used to predict college GPA.  It was expected
that this instruction would prime the widely held stereotype that standardized
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achievement test scores are lower for African Americans than Whites.  This stereotype
should lower the belief that tests are valid indicators of academic performance for
African Americans and this stereotype will be more pronounced on the multiple–choice
test since this is the most widely used format for standardized testing.  It was expected
that there will be a stronger relationship between belief in tests and multiple–choice test
performance than with constructed response test performance.  It was also expected that
there will be African American–White subgroup differences on belief in tests.  Finally,
when differences in belief in tests are controlled by using a constructed response test,
race differences in test performance will be reduced.
H7a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between belief in tests
and test performance.
H7b: There will be a significant relationship between belief in tests and test
format.  Specifically, the belief in tests/multiple–choice relationship will
be stronger than the belief in tests/constructed response relationship.
H7c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
on belief in tests.
H7d: Belief in tests will partially mediate the relationship between race and
test performance such that when controlled, subgroup differences on the
multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.
Stereotype Threat
Stereotype threat is a theory for explaining the behavior and outcomes of
persons in situations in which an identifying, specific sociocultural stereotype is highly
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salient.  Stereotype threat is described by Steele and Aronson (1995) as a person's
"being at risk of confirming, as self–characteristic, a negative stereotype about one's
group" (p. 797).  Stereotype threat is a self–evaluative threat that may operate for
members of any social–identity group defined by a widely held sociocultural stereotype
to which its' members readily identify.  The threat originates from one's personal
identification with a negative stereotype and subsequent fear of fulfilling the stereotype
or appearing to others as an example of the stereotype.  The resulting fear or
self–evaluative threat can substantially interfere with behavior.  Steele and Aronson
(1995) originally proposed this theory to explain lower performance of African
Americans on cognitively loaded tests.  Specifically, they indicated that African
Americans are threatened by the risk of confirming the negative stereotype that African
Americans score lower than Whites on standardized tests of knowledge, skill, ability,
and achievement.  This threatening condition negatively affects anxiety levels and
motivation on a test which directly decreases test performance.  Steele and Aronson
(1995) further explain that as a mechanism to preserve their self–worth and self–esteem,
African American students may actually devalue academic achievement thereby
decreasing their investment in education and further exacerbating African
American–White test score differences.
The theory as applied to testing simply refers to increased anxiety and decreased
motivation in minorities in a high–stakes testing situation due to widely held
stereotypes about the minority group to which the test–taker belongs.  That is, the
test–taker may not internalize or accept the veracity of the stereotype, but the
knowledge that it exists for his/her specific race is enough to stimulate the threatening
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condition.  For example, Steele and Aronson (1998) found that presenting a "difficult
test as diagnostic of ability" produced enough threat due to racial stereotypes in
academically successful African Americans at Stanford University to disrupt
performance on a cognitive ability test.
Evidence suggests the theory not only explains a decrease in test scores for a
specified subgroup as a result of negative race–based stereotypes, but may also explain
an increase in test scores for a specified subgroup as a result of positive race–based
stereotypes.  For example, in a study examining the susceptibility of children to
stereotypes, Ambady, Shih, Kim, and Pittinsky (2001) found that childrens' test
performance may be influenced by priming sociocultural stereotypes.  For instance,
lower elementary school (i.e., K–2nd grade) and middle school (grades 6–8)
Asian–American girls performed significantly better than a control group on a math test
when their ethnic identity was primed and significantly worse than the control group
when their sex identity was primed.  Presumably, when ethnic identity was primed the
girls performed better on the math tests as a result of identifying with the stereotype that
Asians are superior to other ethnic/racial minority groups on math.  In contrast, when
sex identity was primed the Asian–American girls scored worse than boys because they
identified with the stereotype that girls are inferior to boys on math.  Ambady et al.
(2001) provided additional evidence that test performance may be susceptible to the
influence of primed stereotypes in a positive direction.  For example, they found that
lower elementary school and middle school Asian–American boys performed
significantly better on a math test than a control group with no identity priming when
both the ethnic and sex stereotypes were activated.  The implications are that children
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as young as 5 years old are susceptible to prevalent sociocultural stereotypes such as
males are superior in math compared to females and Asian Americans are superior in
math compared to other ethnic groups.
The present study examined the role of stereotype threat on test performance to
partially explain observed subgroup differences on an achievement test.  Participants in
the present study were informed that they would be taking a standardized achievement
test similar to the ACT used to predict college grade point average (GPA).  It was
expected that this instruction set would prime the widely held stereotype that
standardized test scores are lower for African Americans than Whites.  Specifically, it
was believed that the constructed response test would present a less threatening
condition than the multiple–choice test since constructed response tests are not
currently associated with standardized testing.  Consequently, it was hypothesized that
there will be a stronger relationship between stereotype threat and multiple–choice test
performance than with constructed response test performance.  Next, it was expected
that there will be African American–White subgroup differences in perceived
stereotype threat.  Finally, when differences in the threatening condition are controlled
by using a constructed response test, race differences in test performance will be
reduced.
H8a: There will be a significant, negative relationship between perceived
stereotype threat and test performance.
H8b: There will be a significant relationship between stereotype threat and test
format.  Specifically, the stereotype threat/multiple–choice relationship
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will be stronger than the stereotype threat/constructed response
relationship.
H8c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
on perceived stereotype threat.
H8d: Stereotype threat will partially mediate the relationship between race and
test performance such that when controlled, subgroup differences on the
multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.
Self–Efficacy
Self–efficacy is a belief that one has the ability to perform a specific task
successfully (Bandura, 1997).  The relationship between self–efficacy and performance
on many tasks is well established in the literature.  For example, Sadri and Robertson
(1993) reported a corrected correlation between self–efficacy and job performance of
.40 and Ryan (2001) reported the results of research that shows a moderate relationship
(.22 – .23) between self–efficacy and test performance.  There is very little research on
race differences on test–taking self–efficacy.  One exception is Horvath et al. (2000)
who obtained a .18 correlation between race and self–efficacy with African Americans
reporting lower levels of self–efficacy than Whites on a cognitive ability test.
Sarason (1980) reviewed the literature on self–efficacy and anxiety in
test–taking situations and reported a strong relationship between the two constructs. 
Sarason explains that very anxious individuals often worry about their future
performance because they are attending to past failures and potential shortcomings. 
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Hence, test anxiety and self–efficacy may be related through feedback on past test
performance.
Despite the dearth of research on subgroup differences on test–taking self
efficacy, the large body of literature reporting a strong relationship between
self–efficacy and many other criteria suggests that this variable is important for test
performance.  Therefore, the present study examined the role of self–efficacy on test
performance in an attempt to partially explain observed subgroup differences on an
achievement test.  It was expected that there will be a stronger relationship between
self–efficacy and multiple–choice test performance than with constructed response test
performance.  Next, it is expected that there will be African American–White subgroup
differences in self–efficacy.  Finally, when differences in self–efficacy are controlled
using a constructed response test, race differences in test performance will be reduced.
H9a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between self–efficacy
and test performance.
H9b: There will be a significant relationship between self–efficacy and test
format.  Specifically, the self–efficacy/multiple–choice relationship will
be stronger than the self–efficacy/constructed response relationship.
H9c: There will be significant African American–White subgroup differences
on self–efficacy.
H9d: Self–efficacy will partially mediate the relationship between race and
test performance such that when controlled, subgroup differences on the
multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.
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Criterion–Related Validity
Finally, an attempt to resolve the organizational dilemma of developing valid
predictors of job performance that display lower levels of adverse impact should also
evaluate the criterion–related validity of said predictors.  In fact, one limitation of the
extant literature is that examinations of subgroup differences on alternative predictors
of job performance have typically failed to provide any criterion–related validity
evidence.  Although a reliance on content–related validity evidence may not in and of
itself be deficient, the additional demonstration of criterion–related validity would
further bolster the efficacy and utility of the predictor.  Consequently, the present study
compared the criterion–related validity of the constructed response test to the
multiple–choice test using self–reported GPA as the primary criterion measure.  It was
expected that the criterion–related validity for the constructed response test will be
comparable to that of the multiple–choice test.  Furthermore, it was hypothesized that
the relationship between self–reported GPA and constructed response test performance
for African Americans will be the same as that for Whites.
H10a: The multiple–choice/GPA relationship will be the same as the
constructed response/GPA relationship.
H10b: The constructed response/GPA relationship for African Americans will
be the same as the constructed response/GPA relationship for Whites.
Summary of Research Objectives
Using a college student sample, the present study attempted to replicate the
results of Arthur et al. (2002) with a larger sample size and also empirically examine
factors that may explain the reduction in race–based subgroup differences observed on
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the constructed response compared to the multiple–choice test format.  First, it was
expected that race–based subgroup differences will be lower on the constructed
response than the multiple–choice test.  The present study also measured several
variables—reading ability, test–taking skills, face validity, fairness, perceived
predictive validity, belief in tests, stereotype threat, and self–efficacy—that may explain
why subgroup differences are smaller on the constructed response test.  In general, it
was hypothesized that there are racial subgroup differences in reading ability,
test–taking skills, and test perceptions.  Furthermore, it was expected that these
variables are related to test performance.  In contrast to constructed response tests,
multiple–choice tests are more susceptible to the operation of these variables. 
Therefore, observed subgroup differences in test performance may be fully or partially
explained by the observed subgroup differences on these extraneous variables. 
Consequently, eliminating or controlling for the operation of these variables should
reduce subgroup differences on multiple–choice tests to a level similar to that observed
for the constructed response test.  An illustration of the conceptual framework for the
present study is presented in Figure 1.  Much of this framework was derived from a
conceptual model described by Ryan (2001).
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Figure 1. Model of the relationship between reading ability, test–taking skills, and test
perceptions and multiple–choice and constructed response test performance.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited from psychology department subject pools,
upper–level undergraduate courses, and the general campus using posters, fliers, and
newspaper advertisements from Texas A&M University (n = 271), Prairie View A&M
University (n = 133), and the University of Houston (n = 60).  The mean age for the
sample was 20.1 (SD = 2.1).  Sample sizes for each condition by race and sex are
presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Sample Sizes for Each Condition by Race and Sex
Multiple–Choice Constructed Response
Sex African American White African American White Total
Males 34 40 16 54 144
Females 81 67 73 99 320
Total 115 107 89 153 464
Participants recruited from the subject pool received research credit in
introductory psychology; non–subject pool participants received either extra course
credit or $15 for their participation.  There was no significant difference (t [462] = 1.12,
ns) in reported level of effort exhibited on the tests as a function of type of
compensation (i.e., participants that were paid vs. participants that received extra course
credit or research credit in introductory psychology).  There were also no differences
between the two types of compensation and participant scores on any of the study
variables with the exception of age (t [462] = 10.0, p < .001; participants' receiving
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payment mean age = 20.7, SD = 2.32; participants' receiving extra course credit or
research credit mean age = 19.1, SD = 1.20).  However, this difference was expected as
the majority of participants in the latter category received research credit because they
were in introductory psychology classes (n = 180) which consist mostly of
underclassmen (e.g., Freshmen and Sophomores) who are typically younger students. 
To motivate research participants to exert effort on the multiple–choice and constructed
response tests, participants with the 20 highest scores were awarded $30. 
Power analyses (Cohen, 1988) were performed for the hypotheses with the most
conservative test (i.e., multiple regression with a covariate and two independent
variables).  Specifically, regressing the dependent variable test scores on to face validity
(a covariate with the weakest relationship with test performance), race, and test format
yielded multiple R2 = .30 and power of 1.00.  Therefore, the power of the present study
was adequate for all subsequent analyses that involved larger effect sizes or fewer
independent variables.
Measures
Cognitive Ability
The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Short Form (APM; Arthur & Day,
1994; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1994) is a measure of general cognitive ability which
consists of 12 matrix or design problems arranged in an ascending order of difficulty
and is scored by summing the number of problems answered correctly.  The short form
of the APM (Arthur & Day, 1994; Arthur, Tubré, Paul, & Sanchez–Ku, 1999) was used
in the present study to control for any preexisting differences between groups on ability
level.  The APM short form demonstrates psychometric properties similar to that of the
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long form with a reduced administration time of 15 minutes.  The odd/even split–half
reliability with a Spearman–Brown correction for the APM scores was .67.
Reading Ability
Reading ability was measured in the present study using the comprehension
subtest of the Nelson–Denny Reading Test (Brown, Bennet, & Hanna, 1993, Form G). 
The comprehension subtest in Form G consists of seven passages of text and 38,
5–alternative multiple–choice items.  Administration time is 20 minutes and the
technical report provides test–retest reliabilities of .75 to .82 for scores on the
comprehension subtest.  The test has a high school to college reading level and is used
extensively in educational settings.  The data obtained from the pilot study (described
below in a later section) was used to reduce the number of items on the Nelson–Denny
Reading Test to 20 items.  Consequently, the reduction of items resulted in a reduced
administration time of 10 minutes.  In addition, because reading ability was one of the
primary variables of interest in this study, half of the items on the Nelson–Denny
Reading Test were administered in a constructed response format.  This was done to
balance the response formats and prevent artificial inflation of the reading
ability/multiple–choice test performance relationship due to common method variance. 
For the reading ability test, the internal consistency was .65 for the multiple–choice
scores, .67 for the constructed response scores, and .79 for the full 20–item test scores.
Test–Taking Skills
Gibb's (1964) Experimental Test of Testwiseness is generally considered to be
the most comprehensive measure of test–taking skills with the best psychometric
properties (Harmon et al., 1996; Miller et al., 1988; Miller et al., 1990).  The
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Experimental Test of Testwiseness measures a content domain largely unknown to the
general public (i.e., obscure history facts and interpretations).  The test consists of 70
multiple–choice items that, in the absence of knowledge concerning the history content,
can only be answered using secondary, format–related cues, intentionally written into
the items so that highly skilled test–takers will be directed to the correct answer through
knowledge and application of one of 7 types of testwiseness cues.  Administration time
is 25–30 minutes. Gibb (1964) reported a KR–20 reliability of .72 for scores on the
Experimental Test of Testwiseness.  Data from the pilot study (described below in a
later section) was used to reduce the number of items on the Experimental Test of
Testwiseness to 20 items for an administration time of 10 minutes.  The shortened
version of the measure is presented in Appendix A.  The internal consistency for the test
scores was .57.
Standardized Test Coaching.  The present study used one item that asked
participants to indicate if they have ever taken a coaching class for standardized tests
(e.g., the Princeton Review) to examine its influence on test performance.  The item is
in the post–test questionnaire presented in Appendix B.
Experience with Tests.  Prior experience with taking multiple–choice (1 item)
and constructed response tests (1 item) was measured in the present study to determine
it's influence on test performance and as a check on the convergent validity of the
measure of test–taking skills.  Furthermore, researchers have strongly suggested
measuring experience with test–taking when measuring reactions to test formats (Ryan
& Greguras, 1998).  The experience with tests items are in the post–test questionnaire
presented in Appendix B.
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Face Validity
Face validity was measured using four items adopted from Smither et al. (1993). 
Examples of items are "I cannot see any relationship between this test and what is
required in college courses" and "It would be obvious to anyone that this test is related
to college performance."  Ratings were made on a 5–point Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree; 5 = strongly agree).  The internal consistency for the face validity ratings was
.75 in the multiple–choice test condition, .82 for the constructed response test condition,
and .79 across both conditions.  The face validity items are in the Test Attitudes and
Perceptions Survey presented in Appendix C.
Fairness
Perceived fairness was measured using five items adopted from Smither et al.
(1993).  Examples of items are "The test results will accurately reflect how well I
perform on this test" and "I deserve the test results that I will receive on this test." 
Ratings were made on a 5–point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
The internal consistency for the fairness ratings was .65 in the multiple–choice test
condition, .63 in the constructed response test condition, and .64 across both conditions. 
The fairness items are in the Test Attitudes and Perceptions Survey presented in
Appendix C.
Perceived Predictive Validity
Perceived predictive validity was measured using four items adopted from
Smither et al. (1993).  Examples of items are "Failing to pass this test clearly indicates
that you can't pass many college courses and "I am confident that the test can predict
how well an applicant will perform in college courses."  Ratings were made on a
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5–point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).  The internal
consistency for the perceived predictive validity ratings was .78 in the multiple–choice
test condition, .86 in the constructed response test condition, and .82 across both
conditions.  The perceived predictive validity items are in the Test Attitude and
Perceptions Survey presented in Appendix C.
Belief in Tests
Belief in tests was measured using four items adopted from the Test Attitude
Survey (TAS; Arvey et al., 1990) which is a general measure of employment
test–taking attitudes and opinions that may be applied to achievement tests (i.e., ACT)
for selection into colleges.  The original TAS is a 45–item measure of dispositional test
anxiety which measures 9 attitudes toward tests: (1) motivation to perform well on the
test, (2) lack of concentration on the test, (3) belief in tests in general, (4) comparative
anxiety, (5) test ease, (6) external attribution, (7) general need achievement, (8) future
effects, and (9) preparation.  The TAS was written to assess reactions to a test after the
administration of the test.  Therefore, items from Scale 3 were reworded to measure a
belief in tests before the multiple–choice or constructed response test was administered
to obtain a measure of pretest perceptions.  Examples of items are "Tests are a good
way of selecting people for college" and "I don't believe that tests are valid."  Ratings
were made on a 5–point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).  The
internal consistency for the belief in tests ratings was .69 in the multiple–choice test
condition, .70 in the constructed response test condition, and .69 across both conditions. 
The belief in tests items are in the Test Attitudes and Perceptions Survey presented in
Appendix C.
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Stereotype Threat
Stereotype threat was measured using six items adopted from Steele and
Aronson (1995) that ask participants about their knowledge of the stereotype that
standardized tests of ability are biased against African Americans and the degree to
which they identify themselves as "good test–takers".  An example of an item is "I feel
self–conscious when taking tests."  Ratings were made on a 5–point Likert scale (1 =
strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).  The internal consistency for the stereotype threat
ratings was .43 in the multiple–choice test condition, .50 in the constructed response
test condition, and .47 across both conditions.  The stereotype threat items are in the
post–test questionnaire presented in Appendix B.
Self–Efficacy
Self–efficacy was measured using three items adopted from Arthur, Bell, and
Edwards (2003).  The items were developed following principles and guidelines
recommended by Bandura (1997) for the development of self–efficacy scales.   An
example item is "I believe I will perform well on this test."  Ratings were made on a
5–point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).  The internal
consistency for the self–efficacy ratings was .75 in the multiple–choice test condition,
.82 in the constructed response test condition, and .83 across both conditions.  The
self–efficacy items are in the Test Attitudes and Perceptions Survey presented in
Appendix C.
Test–Taking Motivation
Test–taking motivation was measured using eight items adopted from the TAS
(Arvey et al., 1990).  Items from Scale 1 were reworded to measure test–taking
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motivation before the multiple–choice or constructed response test was administered. 
Examples of items are "Doing well on this test is important to me" and "I will try my
best on this test".   Ratings were made on a 5–point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree;
5 = strongly agree).  The internal consistency for the test–taking motivation ratings was
.91 in the multiple–choice test condition, .90 in the constructed response test condition,
and .91 across both conditions.  The test–taking motivation items are in the Test
Attitudes and Perceptions Survey presented in Appendix C.
Level of Effort in the Study
As a check on the participants' level of effort in the study, one item was
administered at the end of the protocol to measure participants' motivation to perform
well on all tests in the protocol using a 5–point scale (1 = no effort, 5 = a lot of effort). 
The item is in the post–test questionnaire presented in Appendix B.
Test–Taking Anxiety
Test–taking anxiety was measured using 10 items adopted from the TAS (Arvey
et al., 1990).  Items from Scale 4 were reworded to measure test–taking anxiety before
the multiple–choice or constructed response test is administered.  Examples of items are
"I am not good at taking tests" and "I usually get very anxious about taking tests". 
Ratings were made on a 5–point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
The internal consistency for the test–taking anxiety ratings was .84 in the
multiple–choice test condition, .87 in the constructed response test condition, and .86
across both conditions.  The test–taking anxiety items are in the Test Attitudes and
Perceptions Survey presented in Appendix C.
55
Dependent Variable
Multiple–Choice Test.  The multiple–choice test measured mathematics and
science reasoning abilities using selected items from the ACT exam (American College
Testing, 2002).  The ACT consists of four subscales (English, mathematics, reading,
and science reasoning).  Only items from the mathematics and science reasoning
subscales of the ACT were used in the present study.  It is difficult to create a
constructed response test using the English subscale from the ACT because there are
multiple answers for each item and the reading subscale is of the same format as the
Nelson–Denny Reading Test used in the present study as a measure of reading ability.
A subset of 20 items (10 math and 10 science reasoning) were selected from a
previously released version of the ACT, preserving their ascending order of difficulty. 
Items on the math portion of the ACT are written in a five–alternative, multiple–choice
format which were retained for the current multiple–choice test.  Items on the science
reasoning portion are written in a four–alternative, multiple–choice format which were
retained for the multiple–choice test.  The number of item types selected for both
sections were similar in proportion to their frequency of occurrence on the original test. 
For the present study, an additional, non–keyed distractor was developed and added to
the items in the science–reasoning section to provide consistency in the number of
alternatives across the test sections.
Participants were given 25 minutes to complete both the math and science
reasoning sections of the test.  Pilot testing (described below in a later section) revealed
that the 25–minute time limit was sufficient for the majority of test–takers to complete
the test.  The test was scored by summing the number of problems answered correctly. 
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The odd/even split–half reliability with a Spearman–Brown correction for the
multiple–choice test scores was .83.
Constructed Response Test.  Constructed response tests must be developed to
limit the range of possible correct responses.  That is, the range of responses should be
constrained such that there will be only one correct response.  This serves to minimize
the subjectivity in scoring and increases reliability.  The constructed response test items
for the present study were designed to meet these criteria and were stem–equivalent to
the multiple–choice test items to ensure maximum content overlap between the two
tests.  The stem–equivalent constructed response format used in the present experiment
was similar to the write–in format used by Arthur et al. (2002).  In fact, the constructed
response test was simply the items on the multiple–choice test with the alternatives
eliminated.  Participants were required to provide the correct answer by writing it on a
blank line under the stem.
Participants were given 25 minutes to complete both the math and science
reasoning sections of the test.  Pilot testing (described below in a later section) revealed
that the 25–minute time limit was sufficient for the majority of test–takers to complete
the test.  The test was scored by summing the number of problems answered correctly. 
A scoring key was developed by the primary researcher that specified the correct
responses for each item.  Two scorers were trained on how to score the test, and
applying this key to each test, scored items as correct or incorrect.  Next, responses
were entered into a text file for analysis.  The two scorers independently scored 14
constructed response tests and the degree of overlap was 95.8%.  The primary
researcher and the two scorers then met to resolve the discrepancies and the scorers
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independently scored an additional 10 tests in which the degree of overlap was 99.2%. 
The remainder of the constructed response tests were scored and entered by only one of
the two scorers.  Based on a sample of 60 tests, it took on average 55 seconds to score
the constructed response test and 31 seconds to enter the scores in a text file.  The
odd/even split–half reliability with a Spearman–Brown correction for the constructed
response test was .78.
Practice Test.  A practice test was created by obtaining four multiple–choice and
constructed response sample items from the math section and four multiple–choice and
constructed response sample items from the science reasoning section of a previously
released version of the ACT.  These items provided participants with exposure to the
content and format of their assigned test (multiple–choice or constructed response) so
that accurate ratings of pretest perceptions could be obtained.
Criteria
Self–reported cumulative college GPA was used as the primary criterion
(Cassady, 2001).  Additional criterion measures such as overall high school GPA, and
high school rank were also collected.  The additional criterion measures were deemed
necessary because a large proportion of the participants were college freshmen (n =
132) who may not yet have a college GPA. 
All criterion data were collected at the beginning (in the demographic
questionnaire) and the end (post–test questionnaire) of the protocol.  The purpose of this
design was to test the "temporal stability" of using self–report to collect these data:
college GPA (r = .99), high school GPA (r = .94), and high school rank (r = .99).  
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In the pilot demographic and post–test questionnaires, participants were asked to
report scores for college GPA, high school GPA, and high school rank.  However, a
large percentage (i.e., 21%) of the scores were missing.  Feedback from some of the
participants during pilot study data collection indicated that this was due to the format
of the items which required participants to recall exact values.  Consequently, the
decision was made to provide a range of values on these items and have participants
select a range instead of a specific, exact value.  For example, college grade point
average was provided on a 7–point scale (1 = 3.5 to 4.0; 2 = 3.0 to 3.4; 3 = 2.5 to 2.9; 4
= 2.0 to 2.4; 5 = 1.5 to 1.9; 6 = 1.0 to 1.4; 7 = Below 1.0).  An additional option was
provided for participants who did not yet have a GPA at their current university.  The
GPA range values were reversed scored such that higher scale values indicate a higher
college GPA.  The items for college GPA, high school GPA, and high school rank are
in the demographic and post–test questionnaires presented in Appendices B and D.
Self–Reported SAT/ACT Scores
Self–reported scores on the SAT and/or ACT were also collected to assess the
convergent validity of the multiple–choice and constructed response tests used in the
present study.  The SAT is the most widely used college entrance test in Texas so this
was the test that was reported by most of the participants (301 reported SAT scores, 82
reported ACT scores, 41 reported both, and 40 did not report SAT or ACT scores).  For
those participants who reported both SAT and ACT scores, only the SAT scores were
used in the analyses.  Scores for the 82 participants who reported only ACT scores were
converted to the SAT scale using the mean (M = 1,115.56) and standard deviation (SD
= 177.65) obtained from the current sample.
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SAT/ACT scores were collected at the beginning (in the demographic
questionnaire) and the end (post–test questionnaire) of the protocol.  The purpose of this
design was to test the "temporal stability" of using self–report to collect these data (r =
.95).  The items for the collection of self–reported SAT/ACT scores are in the
demographic and post–test questionnaires presented in Appendices B and D.
Design and Procedure
Pilot Study
Given the nature of the research questions addressed in the present study, it was
important that all data be collected in a single session.  However, use of most measures
in their original form required an estimated administration time of 2 ½ hours which was
not practically feasible for a single data collection session.  As an alternative, multiple
data collection sessions were also not feasible due to the possibility of high attrition
rates.  Thus, a pilot study was conducted to shorten the measures, refine those
developed for the study, and develop a research protocol that could be administered in
less than two hours.   Therefore, the data from the pilot test were used to reduce the
number of items on the Nelson–Denny Reading Test, Experimental Test of
Testwiseness, and the Test Attitudes and Perceptions Survey.  In addition, time to
completion was recorded for each measure and initially estimated time limits were
reduced to more accurately reflect actual administration time. 
To reduce the specified tests to their target lengths, the tests were administered
to participants in the pilot testing phase of the study and a set of psychometric decision
rules were applied.  First, items with the highest item–total correlations (i.e., above .50)
were retained and in the case of ties, the most difficult items were retained.  To further
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reduce test lengths, items with the strongest contribution to the test's coefficient alpha
were retained until the specified test lengths were obtained.  For the Nelson–Denny
Reading Test and the Experimental Test of Testwiseness, the target test length was 20
items each.  There was no a priori determined target test length for the Test Attitudes
and Perceptions Survey, so the test length was reduced such that only the items with the
best psychometric properties for each construct were retained, reducing the test length
from 42 to 38 items.  Finally, some items on the demographic and post–test
questionnaires were revised or eliminated based on response rates, participants' verbal
feedback, analysis of the data, and further evaluation of the items.  Reducing the tests
and time limits shortened the length of the protocol to 1 hour and 40 minutes.
Present Study 
Table 2 presents the list of the measures, number of items and administration
time both prior to and after the pilot study, and the order in which they were
administered in the research protocol.  The present study used a between–subjects
design.  Thus, participants were randomly assigned to either the multiple–choice test or
constructed response test condition.  Data collection was limited to a single session
which lasted approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes.
  Participants first read and signed the informed consent and provided
demographic (i.e., age, race, sex, and college classification; see Appendix D) and
criterion data.  Next, participants received either the multiple–choice or constructed
response practice test.  Participants read the instruction set as it was read aloud by the
proctor and then completed the practice test.  Participants next completed the Test
Attitudes and Perceptions Survey.  The 20–item achievement test (multiple–choice or
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constructed response) was then administered.   Following completion of the
multiple–choice or constructed response test, participants completed the APM,
Nelson–Denny Reading Test, Experimental Test of Testwiseness, and the post–test
questionnaire.
Table 2
Study Measures
Pre–Pilot Post–Pilot
Measure # Items
Time
(minutes) # Items
Time
(minutes)
Order of
Administration
ADemographic
Questionnaire 5 3 8 3 1
BPractice Test 8 10 8 8 2
BTest Attitudes and
Perceptions Survey 42 20 38 8 3
BMultiple–Choice or
Constructed
Response Test 50 30 20 25 4
CRaven's Short Form 12 15 12 15 5
BNelson–Denny
Reading Test 38 25 20 10 6
BExperimental Test
of Testwiseness 70 40 20 10 7
APost–test
Questionnaire
11 5 9 5 8
TOTAL 236 148 135 84
Note:  AMeasure was created for the present study;  BStandardized test that was altered
for the purposes of the present study;  CStandardized test.
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One concern that arises when recruiting participants to participate in research
where the outcomes have no real consequences is that their level of effort may be much
lower.  Therefore, the present study attempted to enhance participant motivation on the
tests by rewarding $30 to the participants with the highest 20 scores on the tests. 
Furthermore, an item was administered at the end of the protocol that assessed the level
of effort put forth on the tests as a check of motivation.  Participants were urged to do
their very best and to complete each test and survey in its entirety.
Replacement of Missing Data
To equate sample sizes for all of the analyses and thus guard against a loss of
statistical power and bias in the parameter estimates, missing data were replaced using a
multiple regression imputation approach.  Listwise deletion was the least desirable
approach to deal with missing data because it sacrifices a large amount of data. 
Therefore, regression imputation was used because it is appropriate for replacing
missing data when the data are missing both randomly and nonrandomly and when 10%
or less of the data are missing (Roth, 1994).  In addition, it is superior to other missing
data techniques such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, and mean substitution.  For
each variable containing missing data, variables with the largest zero–order correlation
with the missing variable were selected for the regression equation to maximize R2
using scores from only the participants with complete data.  Next, variables were
retained in the regression that yielded a significant, unique contribution to the
prediction of the missing variable score as defined by a significant ∆R2 when introduced
into the equation.  Finally, the participant's data for the missing variable(s) was replaced
with the predicted score by applying the regression weights to the participant's known
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scores.  It is important to note that predictor variables were not used to impute criterion
variables and vice versa as this would artificially inflate the relationships under
investigation.  In addition, missing scores on variables related to perceptions of and
reactions to the specific tests were imputed using regression weights derived only from
the appropriate test condition (i.e., multiple–choice and constructed response).
Among the predictor variables, one participant (< 1%) was missing data for face
validity and perceived predictive validity, two participants (< 1%) were missing data for
perceived fairness, three participants (< 1%) were missing data for test–taking
motivation, and 38 participants (8%) were missing data for stereotype threat.  Part of
the sample (i.e., n = 108) were administered the protocol in a classroom setting and due
to time constraints the measure of test–taking strategies was omitted from the protocol. 
Therefore, 108 participants (23%) were missing data on this variable and scores were
not imputed.  As such, all analyses using test–taking skills were restricted to a sample
of 356.  All other analyses were based on an N of 464.
Among the criterion variables, 27 participants (6%) were missing data for
college GPA, one participant (< 1%) was missing data for high school GPA, and four
participants (< 1%) were missing data for high school rank.  Finally, 40 participants
(9%) were missing data for SAT/ACT scores.
Although they did not exceed the general rule–of–thumb, examination of the
reading ability data indicated that they were negatively skewed (skewness = -1.43). 
Thus, the decision was made to transform the data using a cubed transformation before
performing parametric tests.  The means and standard deviations of raw scores for
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reading ability are reported to allow direct interpretation of results.  However, all
parametric tests were based on the transformed reading ability data.
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables are provided in
Table 3 and for only the hypothesis–related variables in Table 4.  Variables related to
test perceptions (i.e., face validity, fairness, perceived predictive validity, belief in tests,
stereotype threat, self–efficacy, motivation, and anxiety) were measured following the
practice test and prior to the multiple–choice or constructed response test.  Therefore,
ratings were made in reaction to having been exposed to one of the two testing
conditions.  As such, the intercorrelations among these variables are presented
separately for both test formats.
Convergent Validity of the Multiple–Choice and Constructed Response Tests
and SAT Scores
The multiple–choice and the constructed response test were developed using
selected items from the ACT which is often used in selection for college and university
admissions.  Therefore, scores on the multiple–choice and constructed response tests
should be significantly correlated with self–reported scores for the SAT, another test
used in selection for colleges and universities.  As seen in Table 4, SAT scores were
significantly related to scores on both the multiple–choice (r = .62, p < .001, 95% CI =
.53 to .69) and the constructed response (r = .65, p < .001, 95% CI = .57 to .72) test,
demonstrating convergent validity for these two tests.
Standardized Test Coaching
The present study asked participants to indicate if they had ever taken a
coaching class for standardized tests (e.g., the Princeton Review) to examine its
influence on test performance.  The results indicate that there was a significant positive
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relationship between number of standardized test coaching courses taken and test
performance (r = .21, p < .001, 95% CI = .12 to .30).  In addition, the
multiple–choice/coaching and constructed response/coaching relationships were
identical (r = .21, p < .001, 95% CI = .09 to .33).  Whites (M = 5.48, SD = .89) reported
taking more coaching courses than African Americans (M = 4.99, SD = 1.14; t [461] =
4.97, p < .001; d = .48).
Experience with Tests
Prior experience with taking both multiple–choice and constructed response
tests was measured in the present study to determine its relationship with test
performance and as a check on the convergent validity of the measure of test–taking
skills.  First, the relationship between prior experience with taking multiple–choice tests
and performance on the multiple–choice test in the present study was not significant (r
= -.07, ns, 95% CI = -.20 to .06)  Likewise, the relationship between prior experience
with taking constructed response tests and performance on the constructed response test
(r = .12, , ns, 95% CI = .01 to .24) was also not significant.  Therefore, experience with
taking multiple–choice and constructed response tests was not related to test
performance.  Although there were no subgroup differences in experience with taking
multiple–choice tests (t [461] = .26, ns), Whites (M = 3.21, SD = 1.12) reported more
experience with taking constructed response tests than African Americans (M = 2.82,
SD = 1.19; t [459] = 3.64, p < .001; d = .34).  There was no relationship between 
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experience with taking multiple–choice tests and test–taking skills (r = .03, ns, 95% CI
= -.07 to .13) and between experience with taking constructed response tests and
test–taking skills (r = -.02, ns, 95% CI = -.12 to .08).
Level of Effort in the Study
As a check on participants' level of effort exerted in the present study, one item
was administered at the end of the protocol to measure participants' motivation to
perform well on all the tests.  The overall mean for the level of effort exerted in the
protocol (M = 2.68, SD = .95), indicated that participants were "quite a bit motivated to
do their best." There was no difference (t [461] =  1.29, ns; d = .13) in reported level of
effort between African Americans and Whites.
Subgroup Differences on the Multiple–Choice and Constructed Response Tests
The results presented in Table 4 show that performance was higher on the
multiple–choice test than the constructed response test, d = .52, t(463) = 5.84, p < .001. 
To test Hypothesis 1, a 2 (test format) × 2 (race) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted.  Both the main effect for test format (F [1, 460] = 71.37, p < .001, ω2 = .11)
and race (F [1, 460] = 119.21, p < .001, ω2 = .18) were significant, but not the
interaction (F [1, 460] = 1.57, ns).  Therefore, contrary to Hypothesis 1, although
African American–White subgroup differences on the constructed response test
appeared to be smaller (d = .98) than differences on the multiple–choice test (d = 1.33),
the reduction was not statistically significant.  The above results are further illustrated
in Figure 2, which presents subgroup differences on the multiple–choice and
constructed response tests.
78
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
O
ve
ra
ll 
Te
st
 S
co
re
s 
(#
 C
or
re
ct
)
MC Test CR Test
White African American
d = 1.33 d = .98
Figure 2. Subgroup differences in multiple–choice and constructed response test
performance.
Supplementary Analyses for Hypothesis 1
The 12–item short form of the APM was administered in the present study to
statistically control for any preexisting differences between groups on ability level. 
There were minimal differences in APM scores for the multiple–choice (M = 7.13, SD =
2.55) and constructed response test (M = 7.72, SD = 2.24) conditions (t [262] = 2.68, p
< .05, d = .25).  In contrast, subgroup differences on cognitive ability were quite large (t
[262] = 9.52, p < .001, d = .90) with Whites (M = 8.30, SD = 2.15) scoring higher than
African Americans (M = 6.33, SD = 2.26).  Given preexisting differences in cognitive
ability for race and the two testing conditions, a 2 (test format) × 2 (race) analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted using cognitive ability as a covariate.  Again,
both the main effect for test format (F [1, 459] = 102.52, p < .001, ω2 = .06) and race (F
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[1, 459] = 48.66, p < .001, ω2 = .12) were significant, but not the interaction (F [1, 459]
= .81, ns).  Therefore, using cognitive ability as a covariate to statistically remove
preexisting differences, subgroup differences did not differ as a function of test format. 
Thus, although the pattern of results were in the predicted direction, Hypothesis 1 was
not supported.
The primary concern in comparing test formats that purportedly measure the
same content/construct domain is that the test formats themselves may introduce
different construct irrelevant variance.  Indeed, the primary criticism of multiple–choice
tests is that this format measures constructs that are unrelated to the content or a
performance criterion.  Traub (1993) indicates that some traits or constructs may not be
measured similarly by two different test formats.  For example, he indicated that scores
on writing and word knowledge tests may be affected differentially by format while
reading comprehension and most quantitative skills may not yield format effects.  The
multiple–choice and constructed response tests used in the present study measured two
very different constructs—math and science reasoning.  Given Traub's (1993)
interpretation of the literature it seems likely that performance may be impacted by the
construct being measured in the present study (i.e., math vs. science reasoning). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was tested for scores on the math and science reasoning
sections only.
Math Section.  Performance was higher on the math section of the
multiple–choice test (M = 7.04, SD = 2.14) than on the math section of the constructed
response test, (M = 5.31, SD = 2.44; d = .75; t[463] = 8.11, p < .001).  To test
Hypothesis 1 for scores on the math section only, a 2 (test format) × 2 (race) ANOVA
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was conducted.  Both the main effect for test format (F [1, 460] = 94.92, p < .001, ω2 =
.16) and race (F [1, 460] = 45.57, p < .001, ω2 = .07) were significant, but not the
interaction (F [1, 460] = .01, ns).  Therefore, similar to the results obtained for overall
test performance, although African American–White subgroup differences on the math
section of the constructed response test appeared to be smaller (African American M =
4.25, SD = 2.46; White M = 5.93, SD = 2.22; d = .73) than differences on the math
section of the multiple–choice test (African American M = 6.24, SD = 2.22; White M =
7.89, SD = 1.69; d = .83), the reduction was not statistically significant.  The above
results are further illustrated in Figure 3, which presents subgroup differences on the
math sections of the multiple–choice and constructed response tests.
Figure 3. Subgroup differences in test performance on the math sections of the
multiple–choice and constructed response tests.
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Science Reasoning Section.  Performance was higher on the science reasoning
section of the multiple–choice test (M = 6.36, SD = 2.60) than on the science reasoning
section of the constructed response test, (M = 5.80, SD = 2.40; d = .22; t[463] = 2.42, p
< .05).  To test Hypothesis 1 for scores on the science reasoning section only, a 2 (test
format) × 2 (race) ANOVA was conducted.  The main effects for test format (F [1, 460]
= 21.74, p < .001, ω2 = .03) and race (F [1, 460] = 141.05, p < .001, ω2 = .22) and the
interaction (F [1, 460] = 4.97, p < .05, ω2 = .01) were significant.  Contrary to the
results for overall test performance and performance on the math section only, African
American–White subgroup differences on the science reasoning section of the
constructed response test were significantly smaller (African American M = 4.48, SD =
2.53; White M = 6.56, SD = 1.95; d = .96) than differences on the science reasoning
section of the multiple–choice test (African American M = 4.92, SD = 2.34; White M =
7.91, SD = 1.87; d = 1.41).  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported for analyses using
only test performance on the science reasoning section as the dependent variable.  The
above results are further illustrated in Figure 4, which presents subgroup differences on
the science reasoning sections of the multiple–choice and constructed response tests.  It
is important to note that this effect is due to differentiated decrements and not
improvements in test performance.
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Figure 4. Subgroup differences in test performance on the science reasoning sections of
the multiple–choice and constructed response tests.
Reading Ability
The relationships between race, reading ability and multiple–choice and
constructed response test performance posited in Hypotheses 2a–2d are predicated on
the assumption that the reading load of the multiple–choice test was higher than a
stem–equivalent constructed response test.  The results of a readability analysis which
are presented in Table 5, show that the constructed response test consisted of 27%
fewer words and 46% fewer sentences than the multiple–choice test.  However, their
reading grade levels were comparable.  Therefore, the reading load on the
multiple–choice test was higher than the reading load on the constructed response test.
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Table 5
Readability Analysis for the Multiple–Choice and Constructed Response Test Formats
Test Items
Statistic
Multiple–Choice
Constructed
Response
Item Stem and
Alternatives Item Stem Only Item Stem OnlyA
Number of items 20 20 20
Number of words 1,438 1,048 1,058
Number of sentences 421 229 250
Average word per sentence 3 5 4
Average word length 5 5 5
Grade level
(Flesch–Kincaid)
9.12 9.35 9.10
Note.  AConstructed response format does not have any alternatives.
Hypotheses 2a–2d were tested by running a series of regressions (see Table 6).
Hypothesis 2a predicted a significant, positive relationship between reading ability and
test performance.  In support of Hypothesis 2a, there was a significant relationship
between reading ability and test performance (R2 = .25, p < .001).  Next, Hypothesis 2b
predicted a significant relationship between reading ability and test format such that the
reading ability/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be stronger than
the reading ability/constructed response test performance relationship.  To test this
hypothesis, reading ability was regressed on the test format × test performance
interaction term which was not significant (R2 = .01, ns).  Consistent with this, the
difference between the reading ability/multiple–choice test performance correlation (r =
.59, p < .001, 95% CI = .50 to .67) and reading ability/constructed response test
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performance correlation (r = .50, p < .001, 95% CI = .40 to .59) was not significant (z =
1.37, ns).  Therefore, the relationship between reading ability and test performance did
not differ as a function of test format.  Hypothesis 2c predicted that there would be
significant subgroup differences in reading ability.  Consistent with this prediction,
there was a significant relationship between race and reading ability (R2 = .19, p < .001)
indicating that there were large, subgroup differences on reading ability (d = .98). 
Specifically, Whites (M = 18.16, SD = 1.94) scored higher on reading ability than
African Americans (M = 15.61, SD = 3.45).
Table 6
Results of Regressions for Reading Ability (Hypotheses 2a–2d)
Hypothesis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
2a Test Performance Reading Ability .50* .25*
2b Reading Ability Test Format × Test
Performance .08  .01  
2c Reading Ability Race .44* .19*
2d Test Performance Race .43* .18*
Reading Ability Race .44* .19*
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Reading Ability .50* .25*
Step 2 Test Performance Reading Ability .38* .25*
Race .26* .30* .05*
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation. *p < .001.
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Finally, Hypothesis 2d predicted that reading ability would partially mediate the
relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.  The hypothesized mediation effects specified in Hypothesis
2d, were assessed in accordance with standards outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986)
who specify three conditions that must be met to infer mediation—(a) race (independent
variable) must be related to test performance (dependent variable), (b) race must be
related to reading ability (mediator variable), and (c) when the independent variable and
mediator are considered simultaneously, the direct relationship between the independent
and dependent variable should show a significant decrease (partial mediation).  The
results presented in Table 6 indicate that all the criteria for mediation were met.  In
addition, they show a significant decrease in the unique variance explained by race (∆R2
= .05 vs. R2 = .18) after controlling for reading ability, demonstrating support for partial
mediation.  Finally, Sobel's (1982) test for the indirect effect of race and test
performance through reading ability was significant (Sobel = 6.40, p < .01).  Given that
reading ability was a partial mediator, a 2 (test format) × 2 (race) ANCOVA was
computed with reading ability used as a covariate to further test Hypothesis 2d.  Again,
the main effects for test format (F [1, 459] = 91.92, p < .001, ω2 = .12) and race (F [1,
459] = 43.33, p < .001, ω2 = .05) were significant, but the interaction was not (F [1,
459] = .17, ns).
In summary, there was support for Hypotheses 2a, 2c, and 2d in that reading
ability was related to test performance, there were subgroup differences on reading
ability, and reading ability partially mediated the relationship between race and test
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performance.  However, the strength of mediation was not sufficient to reduce subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test to the levels of subgroup differences observed
on the constructed response test.
Test–Taking Skills
A number of regressions were run to test Hypotheses 3a–3d (see Table 7). 
Hypothesis 3a predicted a significant, positive relationship between test–taking skills
and test performance.  In support of Hypothesis 3a, there was a significant relationship
between test–taking skills and test performance (R2 = .10, p < .001).  Next, Hypothesis
3b predicted a significant relationship between test–taking skills and test format such
that the test–taking skills/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be
stronger than the test–taking skills/constructed response test relationship.  To test this
hypothesis, test–taking skills was regressed on the test format × test performance
interaction term which was not significant (R2 = .00, ns).  Consistent with this, the
difference between the test–taking skills/multiple–choice test performance correlation (r
= .33, p < .001, 95% CI = .18 to .46) and test–taking skills/constructed response test
performance correlation (r = .36, p < .001, 95% CI = .23 to .48) was not significant (z =
.36, ns).  Therefore, the relationship between test–taking skills and test performance did
not differ as a function of test format.  Hypothesis 3c predicted that there would be
significant subgroup differences on test–taking skills.  Consistent with this prediction,
there was a significant relationship between race and test–taking skills (R2 = .05, p <
.001) indicating that there were moderate subgroup differences on test–taking skills (d =
.49).  Specifically, Whites scored higher (M = 9.01, SD = 3.14) on test–taking skills
than African Americans (M = 7.52, SD = 2.74).
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Table 7
Results of Regressions for Test–Taking Skills (Hypotheses 3a–3d) 
Hypothesis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
3a Test Performance Test–Taking Skills .32* .10*
3b Test–Taking Skills Test Format × Test
Performance .07  .00  
3c Test–Taking Skills Race .21* .05*
3d Test Performance Race .31* .09*
Test–Taking Skills Race .21* .05*
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Test–Taking Skills .32* .10*
Step 2 Test Performance Test–Taking Skills .27* .10*
Race .25* .16* .06*
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .001.
Finally, Hypothesis 3d predicted that test–taking skills would partially mediate
the relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.  The results presented in Table 7 indicate that all the criteria
for mediation were met.  In addition, they show a significant decrease in the unique
variance explained by race (∆R2 = .06 vs. R2 = .09) after controlling for test–taking
skills, demonstrating support for partial mediation.  Finally, Sobel's (1982) test for the
indirect effect of race and test performance through test–taking skills was significant
(Sobel = 4.02, p < .001).  Given that test–taking skills was a partial mediator, a 2 (test
format) × 2 (race) ANCOVA was computed with test–taking skills used as a covariate
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to further test Hypothesis 3d.  The main effects for test format (F [1, 351] = 76.64, p <
.001, ω2 = .15) and race (F [1, 351] = 30.01, p < .001, ω2 = .06) were significant, but the
interaction was not (F [1, 351] = .00, ns).
In summary, there was support for Hypotheses 3a, 3c, and 3d in that test–taking
skills was related to test performance, there were subgroup differences on test–taking
skills, and test–taking skills partially mediated the relationship between race and test
performance.  However, the strength of mediation was not sufficient to reduce subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test to the levels of subgroup differences observed
on the constructed response test.
Test Perceptions
As shown in Table 4, test perceptions were similar across the two test formats. 
For example, standardized differences on test perceptions between the two conditions
were minimal and ranged from d = .00 to .12.  The largest differences were for face
validity (d = .12), belief in tests (d = .09) and stereotype threat (d = .06).  Contrary to
expectations, the multiple–choice test was seen as being more face valid than the
constructed response test.  However, reported stereotype threat was higher in the
multiple–choice than the constructed response test condition.  Belief in tests was the
only construct that was not test specific as it refers to the strength of the belief that tests
in general are valid indicators of job performance.  Nevertheless, it is entirely likely that
responses to this measure were influenced by test format as participants in the
constructed response test condition reported higher levels of belief in tests.  Therefore,
where relevant, analyses related to belief in tests were conducted by test condition,
similar to the other test perceptions.
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Face Validity
Hypotheses 4a–4d were tested by running a series of regressions (see Table 8). 
Hypothesis 4a predicted a significant, positive relationship between face validity and
test performance.  Contrary to Hypothesis 4a, there was no relationship between face
validity and test performance (R2 = .00, ns).  Next, Hypothesis 4b predicted a significant
relationship between face validity and test format such that the face
validity/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be stronger than the face
validity/constructed response test performance relationship.  To test this hypothesis,
face validity was regressed on the test format × test performance interaction term which
was not significant (R2 = .00, ns).  Therefore, the relationship between face validity and
test performance did not differ as a function of test format.  Hypothesis 4c predicted
that there would be significant subgroup differences on face validity.  Given that ratings
of face validity were made in reaction to having been exposed to one of the two testing
conditions, the interaction between race and test format was regressed onto face
validity.  The results in Table 8 show that there was a significant relationship between
race and face validity (R2 = .01, p < .05) indicating that there were small subgroup
differences on face validity (d = .21).  Specifically, African Americans reported higher
levels of face validity (M = 2.82, SD = .73) than Whites (M = 2.67, SD = .72). 
However, the relationship between race and face validity did not differ as a function of
test format (β = .15, ns).
Finally, Hypothesis 4d predicted that face validity would partially mediate the
relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
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constructed response test.  The results presented in Table 8 indicate that all the criteria
for mediation were met.  However, they show that there was no decrease in the unique
variance explained by race (∆R2 = .18 vs. R2 = .18) after controlling for face validity, so
there was no support for partial mediation.
Table 8
Results of Regressions for Face Validity (Hypotheses 4a–4d)
Hypothesis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
4a Test Performance Face Validity .00      .00      
4b Face Validity Test Format × Test
Performance .05      .00      
4c Face Validity Race -.18** 
Face Validity Test Format -.06     
Face Validity Test Format × Race .15      .02*    
4d Test Performance Race .43*** .18***
Face Validity Race -.10*   .01*    
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Face Validity .00      .00      
Step 2 Test Performance Face Validity .04      .00      
Race .43*** .18*** .18***
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001.
In summary, support was obtained for only Hypothesis 4c in that there were
significant subgroup differences in face validity.  There was no support for Hypotheses
4a, 4b and 4d.  Therefore, face validity was not related to test performance, did not
91
differ as a function of test format, and did not appear to mediate the relationship
between race and test performance.
Fairness
A number of regressions were run to test Hypotheses 5a–5d (see Table 9). 
Hypothesis 5a predicted a significant, positive relationship between fairness and test
performance.  Consistent with Hypothesis 5a, there was a significant relationship
between fairness and test performance (R2 = .04, p < .001).  Next, Hypothesis 5b
predicted a significant relationship between fairness and test format such that the
fairness/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be stronger than the
fairness/constructed response test performance relationship.  To test this hypothesis,
fairness was regressed on the test format × test performance interaction term which was
not significant (R2 = .00, ns).  Consistent with this, the difference between the
fairness/multiple–choice test performance correlation (r = .30, p < .001, 95% CI = .18
to .42) and the fairness/constructed response test performance correlation (r = .17, p <
.001, 95% CI = .04 to .29) was not significant (z = 1.47, ns).  Therefore, the relationship
between fairness and test performance did not differ as a function of test format. 
Hypothesis 5c predicted that there would be significant subgroup differences on
fairness.  Given that ratings of fairness were made in reaction to having been exposed to
one of the two testing conditions, the interaction between race and test format was
regressed onto fairness.  The results in Table 9 show that there was a significant
relationship between race and fairness as a function of test format (β = .26, p < .001). 
Specifically, Whites (M = 3.26, SD = .49) reported higher levels of fairness than
African Americans (M = 2.98, SD = .61; d = .54) on the multiple–choice test and
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African Americans (M = 3.22, SD = .52) reported higher levels of fairness than Whites
(M = 3.18, SD = .53; d = .09) on the constructed response test.  The above results are
further illustrated in Figure 5, which presents subgroup differences in reported fairness
in the multiple–choice and constructed response test conditions.
Figure 5. Subgroup differences in fairness in the multiple–choice and constructed
response test conditions.
Finally, Hypothesis 5d predicted that fairness would partially mediate the
relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.  The results in Table 9 indicate that all the criteria for
mediation were met.  In addition, they show that there was a significant decrease in the
unique variance explained by race (∆R2 = .17 vs. R2 = .18) after controlling for fairness,
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so there was support for partial mediation.  Finally, Sobel's (1982) test for the indirect
effect of race and test performance through fairness was significant (Sobel = 3.55, p <
.001).  Given that fairness was a partial mediator, a 2 (test format) × 2 (race) ANCOVA
was computed with fairness used as a covariate to further test Hypothesis 5d.  The main
effects for test format (F [1, 459] = 78.80, p < .001, ω2 = .11) and race (F [1, 459] =
111.59, p < .001, ω2 = .16) were significant, but the interaction was not (F [1, 351] =
.33, ns).
Table 9
Results of Regressions for Fairness (Hypotheses 5a–5d)
Hypothesis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
5a Test Performance Fairness .21** .04**
5b Fairness Test Format × Test
Performance .02    .00   
5c Fairness Race -.04    
Fairness Test Format -.23**
Fairness Test Format × Race .26** .04**
5d Test Performance Race .43** .18**
Fairness Race .12*  .01*  
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Fairness .21** .04**
Step 2 Test Performance Fairness .16** .04**
Race .41** .21** .17**
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .01, **p < .001.
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In summary, support was obtained for Hypotheses 5a, 5c, and 5d in that fairness
was related to test performance, there were significant subgroup differences in fairness
as a function of test format, and fairness mediated the relationship between race and test
performance.  However, the strength of the mediation was not sufficient to reduce
subgroup differences on the multiple–choice test to the levels of subgroup differences
observed on the constructed response test.
Perceived Predictive Validity
Hypotheses 6a–6d were tested by running a series of regressions (see Table 10). 
Hypothesis 6a predicted a significant, positive relationship between perceived
predictive validity and test performance.  Consistent with Hypothesis 6a, there was a
significant relationship between perceived predictive validity and test performance (R2
= .02, p < .01).  Next, Hypothesis 6b predicted a significant relationship between
perceived predictive validity and test format such that the perceived predictive
validity/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be stronger than the
perceived predictive validity/constructed response test performance relationship.  To
test this hypothesis, perceived predictive validity was regressed on the test format × test
performance interaction term which was not significant (R2 = .00, ns).  Consistent with
this, the difference between the perceived predictive validity/multiple–choice test
performance correlation (r = .13, p < .01, 95% CI = .00 to .26) and the perceived
predictive validity/constructed response test performance correlation (r = .12, p < .05,
95% CI = -.01 to .24) was not significant (z = .11, ns).  Therefore, the relationship
between perceived predictive validity and test performance did not differ as a function
of test format.  Hypothesis 6c predicted that there would be significant subgroup
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differences on perceived predictive validity.  Given that ratings of perceived predictive
validity were made in reaction to having been exposed to one of the two testing
conditions, the interaction between race and test format was regressed onto perceived
predictive validity.  The results in Table 10 show that there was a significant
relationship between race and perceived predictive validity as a function of test format
(β = .18, p < .05).  Specifically, Whites (M = 2.22, SD = .63) reported higher levels of
perceived predictive validity than African Americans (M = 2.06, SD = .71; d = .24) on
the multiple–choice test and African Americans (M = 2.21, SD = .73; d = .19) reported
higher levels of face validity than Whites (M = 2.07, SD = .73) on the constructed
response test.  The above results are further illustrated in Figure 6, which presents
subgroup differences in perceived predictive validity in the multiple–choice and
constructed response test conditions.
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Figure 6.  Subgroup differences in perceived predictive validity in the multiple–choice
and constructed response test conditions.
Finally, Hypothesis 6d posited that perceived predictive validity would partially
mediate the relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled,
subgroup differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed
for the constructed response test.  The results presented in Table 10 indicate that the
relationship between race and perceived predictive validity was not significant, so the
criteria for mediation were not met.
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Table 10
Results of Regressions for Perceived Predictive Validity (Hypotheses 6a–6d) 
Hypothesis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
6a Test Performance PredictiveA .12** .02**  
6b Predictive Test Format × Test
Performance    .05    .00      
6c Predictive Race -.10      
Predictive Test Format -.11      
Predictive Test Format × Race .18*    .01      
6d Test Performance Race .43*** .18***
Predictive Race .00      .00      
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Predictive .12**  .02**  
Step 2 Test Performance Predictive .12**  .02**  
Race .43*** .20*** .18**
Note.  APerceived predictive validity.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison
between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for mediation.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
In summary, support was obtained for only Hypotheses 6a and 6c in that
perceived predictive validity was related to test performance and there were significant
subgroup differences as a function of test format.  However, there was no support for
Hypotheses 6b and 6d.  As such, perceived predictive validity did not differ as a
function of test format and perceived predictive validity did not appear to serve as a
partial mediator of the race/test performance relationship.
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Belief in Tests
A number of regressions were run to test Hypotheses 7a–7d (see Table 11). 
Hypothesis 7a predicted a significant, positive relationship between belief in tests and
test performance.  In support of Hypothesis 7a, there was a significant relationship
between belief in tests and test performance (R2 = .02, p < .001).  Next, Hypothesis 7b
predicted a significant relationship between belief in tests and test format such that the
belief in tests/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be stronger than the
belief in tests/constructed response test performance relationship.  To test this
hypothesis, belief in tests was regressed on the test format × test performance
interaction term which was not significant (R2 = .00, ns).  Consistent with this, the
difference between the belief in tests/multiple–choice test performance correlation (r =
.15, p < .01, 95% CI = .02 to .28) and the belief in tests/constructed response test
performance correlation (r = .19, p < .001, 95% CI = .07 to .31) was not significant (z =
.44, ns).  Therefore, the relationship between belief in tests and test performance did not
differ as a function of test format.  Hypothesis 7c predicted that there would be
significant subgroup differences on belief in tests.  Given that ratings of belief in tests
were made in reaction to having been exposed to one of the two testing conditions, the
interaction between race and test format was regressed onto belief in tests.  However,
the results presented in Table 11 show that there was no relationship between race and
belief in tests as a function of test format (β = .10, ns).
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Table 11
Results of Regressions for Belief in Tests (Hypotheses 7a–7d)
Hypothesis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
7a Test Performance BeliefA .15* .02*
7b Belief Test Format × Test
Performance .00  .00  
7c Belief Race -.07  
Belief Test Format -.12  
Belief Test Format × Race .10  .01  
7d Test Performance Race .43* .18*
Belief Race .00  .00  
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Belief .15* .02*
Step 2 Test Performance Belief .15* .02*
Race .43* .20* .18*
Note.  ABelief in tests.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2
for the test for mediation.  *p < .001.
Finally, Hypothesis 7d predicted that belief in tests would partially mediate the
relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.  The results in Table 11 indicate that the relationship between
race and belief in tests was not significant, so the criteria for mediation were not met.
In summary, support was obtained for only Hypothesis 7a in that there was a
significant, positive relationship between belief in tests and test performance.  However,
there was no support for Hypotheses 7b, 7c and 7d.  As such, belief in tests did not
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differ as a function of test format, there were no observed subgroup differences in belief
in tests, and belief in tests did not appear to serve as a partial mediator of the race/test
performance relationship.
Stereotype Threat
Hypotheses 8a–8d were tested by running a series of regressions (see Table 12). 
Hypothesis 8a predicted a significant, positive relationship between stereotype threat
and test performance.  In support of Hypothesis 8a, there was a significant relationship
between stereotype threat and test performance (R2 = .10, p < .001).  Next, Hypothesis
8b predicted a significant relationship between stereotype threat and test format such
that the stereotype threat/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be
stronger than the stereotype threat/constructed response test performance relationship. 
To test this hypothesis, stereotype threat was regressed on the test format × test
performance interaction term which was not significant (R2 = .00, ns).  Consistent with
this, the difference between the stereotype threat/multiple–choice test performance
correlation (r = -.27, p < .001, 95% CI = -.39 to -.14) and the stereotype
threat/constructed response test performance correlation (r = -.41, p < .001, 95% CI = -
.51 to -.30) was not significant (z = 1.70, ns).  Therefore, the relationship between
stereotype threat and test performance did not differ as a function of test format. 
Hypothesis 8c predicted that there would be significant subgroup differences on
stereotype threat.  Given that ratings of stereotype threat were made in reaction to
having been exposed to one of the two testing conditions, the interaction between race
and test format was regressed onto stereotype threat.  However, the results presented in
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Table 12 show that there was no relationship between race and stereotype threat as a
function of test format (β = .01, ns).
Table 12
Results of Regressions for Stereotype Threat (Hypotheses 8a–8d)
Hypothesis Dependent
Variable
Independent Variable
β R2 ∆R2
8a Test Performance Stereotype Threat -.32* .10*
8b Stereotype Threat Test Format × Test
Performance -.03  .00  
8c Stereotype Threat Race -.08  
Stereotype Threat Test Format .02  
Stereotype Threat Test Format × Race .01  .01  
8d Test Performance Race .43* .18*
Stereotype Threat Race -.08  .01  
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Stereotype Threat -.32*  .10*
Step 2 Test Performance Stereotype Threat -.29*  .10*
Race .41*  .27* .17*
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .001.
Finally, Hypothesis 8d predicted that stereotype threat would partially mediate
the relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.  The results presented in Table 12 indicate that the criteria for
mediation were not met.
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In summary, support was obtained for only Hypothesis 8a in that there was a
significant, positive relationship between stereotype threat and test performance. 
However, there was no support for Hypotheses 8b, 8c and 8d.  As such, stereotype
threat did not differ as a function of test format, there were no observed subgroup
differences in stereotype threat, and stereotype threat did not appear to serve as a partial
mediator of the race/test performance relationship.
Self–Efficacy
A number of regressions were run to test Hypotheses 9a–9d (see Table 13). 
Hypothesis 9a predicted a significant, positive relationship between self–efficacy and
test performance.  In support of Hypothesis 9a, there was a significant relationship
between self–efficacy and test performance (R2 = .08, p < .001).  Next, Hypothesis 9b
predicted a significant relationship between self–efficacy and test format such that the
self–efficacy/multiple–choice test performance relationship would be stronger than the
self–efficacy/constructed response test performance relationship.  To test this
hypothesis, self–efficacy was regressed on the test format × test performance interaction
term which was not significant (R2 = .00, ns).  Consistent with this, the difference
between the self–efficacy/multiple–choice test performance correlation (r = .22, p <
.001, 95% CI = .09 to .34) and the self–efficacy/constructed response test performance
correlation (r = .35, p < .001, 95% CI = .23 to .46) was not significant (z = 1.51, ns). 
Therefore, the relationship between self–efficacy and test performance did not differ as
a function of test format.  Hypothesis 9c predicted that there would be significant
subgroup differences on self–efficacy.  Given that ratings of self–efficacy were made in
reaction to having been exposed to one of the two testing conditions, the interaction
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between race and test format was regressed onto self–efficacy.  The results presented in
Table 13 show that there was a significant relationship between race and self–efficacy
(β = -.12, p < .05).  Specifically, African Americans reported higher levels of
self–efficacy (M = 3.38, SD = .78) than Whites (M = 3.20, SD = .79).  However, the
relationship between race and self–efficacy did not differ as a function of test format (β
= .07, ns).
Table 13
Results of Regressions for Self–Efficacy (Hypotheses 9a–9d)
Hypothesis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
9a Test Performance Self–Efficacy .28** .08**
9b Self–Efficacy Test Format × Test
Performance .06    .00    
9c Self–Efficacy Race -.12*  
Self–Efficacy Test Format -.06    
Self–Efficacy Test Format × Race .07    .02    
9d Test Performance Race .43** .18**
Self–Efficacy Race -.12*  .01*  
Tests for mediation
Step 1 Test Performance Self–Efficacy .28** .08**
Step 2 Test Performance Self–Efficacy .33** .08**
Race .47** .29** .21**
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .05, **p < .001.
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Finally, Hypothesis 9d predicted that self–efficacy would partially mediate the
relationship between race and test performance such that when controlled, subgroup
differences on the multiple–choice test will be reduced to the levels observed for the
constructed response test.  The results presented in Table 13 indicate that all the criteria
for mediation were met.  In addition, they show that there was a significant increase in
the unique variance explained by race (∆R2 = .21 vs. R2 = .18) after controlling for
self–efficacy.  This pattern of results can only be interpreted within the context of
reciprocal suppression (Conger, 1974).  Reciprocal suppression occurs when two
predictor variables are positively correlated with the criterion, but measure irrelevant
variance in the criterion directionally opposite one another.  The result is that prediction
is improved with the linear combination of the two predictor variables over what would
be expected from their zero–order correlations with the criterion.  The conditions of
reciprocal suppression are when (a) the two predictors have a negative correlation, and
(b) both regression weights for the predictor/criterion relationships exceed the
zero–order correlations when the variables are simultaneously entered into a regression
equation.  The pattern of results in these analyses met both of these conditions.  For
example, self–efficacy and race were negatively correlated (r = -.12, p < .05) such that
being African American was generally associated with higher self–efficacy scores.  The
regression weights for both the self–efficacy/test performance relationship (β = .33, r =
.28, p < .001) and race/test performance relationship (β = .47, r = .43, p < .001)
exceeded the zero–order correlations when both variables were entered into the
regression equation.  In this prediction equation, both race and self–efficacy were
considered suppressor variables.
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In summary, there was support for Hypotheses 9a and 9c, in that self–efficacy
was related to test performance and there were significant subgroup differences on
self–efficacy.  However, there was no support for Hypotheses 9b and 9d.
Criterion–Related Validity
Hypothesis 10a posited that the multiple–choice/college GPA relationship
would be the same as the constructed response/college GPA relationship.  Table 4
shows that the correlation between multiple–choice test performance and college GPA
(r = .13, p < .01, 95% CI = .00 to .26) was lower than the correlation between the
constructed response test and college GPA (r = .20, p < .001, 95% CI = .08 to .32). 
However, this difference was not significant (z = .77, ns).
Hypothesis 10b predicted that the constructed response/college GPA
relationship for African Americans would be the same as the constructed
response/college GPA relationship for Whites.  As shown in Table 14, the correlation
between constructed response test performance and college GPA for African Americans
(r = .29, p < .001, 95% CI = .09 to .47) was higher than the correlation between
constructed response test performance and college GPA for Whites (r = .18, p < .05,
95% CI = .02 to .33).  However, this difference was not significant (z = .86, ns).  The
results presented in Table 14 also indicate that the correlation between multiple–choice
test performance and college GPA for African Americans (r = .09, ns, 95% CI = -.10 to
.27) was lower than the correlation between multiple–choice test performance and
college GPA for Whites (r = .13, ns, 95% CI = -.06 to .32).  However, neither
correlation was significant.
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It was anticipated that many freshmen participants (n = 132) would not have
cumulative college GPAs so that much of the sample would be missing data on this 
Table 14
Correlations between Multiple–Choice and Constructed Response Test Performance
and the Criterion Measures for African Americans and Whites
Multiple–Choice Constructed Response
Criteria
African American
(n = 115)
White
(n = 107)
African American
(n = 89)
White
(n = 153)
College GPA .09      .13      .29**  .18*    
High School GPA .32*** .32*** .42*** .31***
High School Rank .24*    .29**  .18      .20*    
Note:  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
variable.  As such, it was deemed necessary to collect additional criterion data such as
high school GPA and high school rank in the event that a large percentage of the sample
did not provide information on college GPA.  However, most of the data were collected
in the spring semester so the majority of freshmen had at least one semester of college
grades on which to estimate their college GPA.  In fact, only 27 participants (6% of the
total sample) were missing data for college GPA, although 23 of the 27 were indeed
freshman.  Nevertheless, the regression–based approach to imputing missing data scores
is accurate with less than 10% of the data missing and when the data are missing
non–randomly (Roth, 1994), as was the case with the present data set.  Therefore, the
decision was made to impute missing scores for college GPA and use this variable as
the primary criterion.  However, data were gathered for high school GPA and high
school rank so these variables were also used to test Hypotheses 10a and 10b.
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As shown in Table 4, the correlation between the multiple–choice test
performance and high school GPA (r = .36, p < .001, 95% CI = .24 to .47) was lower
than the correlation between the constructed response test performance and high school
GPA (r = .46, p < .001, 95% CI = .35 to .55).  However, this difference was not
significant (z = 1.29, ns).  As shown in Table 14, the correlation between constructed
response test performance and high school GPA for African Americans (r = .42, p <
.001, 95% CI = .23 to .58) was higher than the correlation between constructed response
test performance and high school GPA for Whites (r = .31, p < .001, 95% CI = .16 to
.45).  However, this difference was not significant (z = .94, ns).  The results presented in
Table 14 also indicate that the correlation between multiple–choice test performance
and high school GPA for African Americans (r = .32, p < .001, 95% CI = .15 to .47)
was the same as the correlation between multiple–choice test performance and high
school GPA for Whites (r = .32, p < .001, 95% CI = .14 to .48).
Finally, the correlation between the multiple–choice test and high school rank (r
= .30, p < .001, 95% CI = .18 to .41) was higher than the correlation between the
constructed response test and high school rank (r = .27, p < .001, 95% CI = .15 to .38). 
However, this difference was not significant (z = .35, ns).  As shown in Table 14, the
correlation between constructed response test performance and high school rank for
African Americans (r = .18, ns, 95% CI = -.02 to .37) was comparable to the correlation
between constructed response test performance and college rank for Whites (r = .20, p <
.05, 95% CI = .04 to .35).  Therefore, using high school rank as the criterion, the
overlapping confidence intervals and significance test (z = .15, ns) suggest that the
criterion–related validity of the constructed response test was the same for both African
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Americans and Whites.  The results presented in Table 14 also indicate that the
correlation between multiple–choice test performance and high school rank for Whites
(r = .29, p < .01, 95% CI = .11 to .45) was higher than the correlation between
multiple–choice test performance and high school rank for African Americans (r = .24,
p < .05, 95% CI = .06 to .40).  However, this difference was also not significant (z =
.40, ns).
Supplementary Analyses
The model presented in Figure 1 posits that each of the six test perception
variables (i.e., face validity, fairness, perceived predictive validity, belief in tests,
stereotype threat, and self–efficacy) is related to all of the other test perception
variables.  In addition, the model indicates that face validity, fairness, perceived
predictive validity, and belief in tests mediate the relationship between race and
motivation with stereotype threat and self–efficacy mediating the relationship between
race and motivation and anxiety.  It was also posited that test–taking motivation and
anxiety are directly related to test performance.  To examine these relationships that are
implied in the model presented in Figure 1, supplementary analyses were conducted for
each of the six test perception variables.
Face Validity
An examination of the correlations in Table 4 shows that face validity was
significantly related to fairness, perceived predictive validity, and belief in tests in both
test format conditions, but related to self–efficacy in only the constructed response test
condition.  Face validity was not related to stereotype threat in either test format
condition.  The magnitude of the correlations ranged from  r = -.04 to .43 (absolute
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mean r = .22, SD = .16) in the multiple–choice test condition and ranged from r = -.09
to .54 (absolute mean r = .34, SD = .20) in the constructed response test condition.  In
general, the relationships between face validity and the other perception variables were
stronger in the constructed response than the multiple–choice test condition (with the
exception of stereotype threat).
The model in Figure 1 posits that face validity mediates the relationship between
race and test performance, only through its relationship with motivation which is
directly related to test performance.  To test these relationships, two sets of regressions
were computed in accordance with standards outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  The
first set of regressions tested the extent to which face validity mediated the relationship
between race and motivation.  As shown in Table 15, all three criteria for mediation
were met, but there was no decrease in the unique variance explained by race (∆R2 = .03
vs. R2 = .03) after controlling for face validity.  Therefore, face validity did not mediate
the relationship between race and motivation.  The second set of regressions tested the
extent to which motivation mediated the relationship between face validity and test
performance.  As shown in Table 15, the criteria for mediation were not met and hence,
there was no evidence that motivation mediated the relationship between face validity
and test performance.
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Table 15
Mediation Tests for the Relationship among Face Validity, Motivation, Anxiety, and
Test Performance from Figure 1
Relationship
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
Race Face
Validity
Motivation
Motivation Race -.19*** .03***
Face Validity Race -.10*    .01*    
Step 1 Motivation Face Validity .16*** .02***
Step 2 Motivation Face Validity .14**  .02***
Race -.17*** .05*** .03***
Face Validity
Motivation Test
Performance
Test Performance Face Validity .00      .00      
Motivation Face Validity .16*** .02***
Step 1 Test Performance Motivation .05      .00      
Step 2 Test Performance Motivation .05      .00      
Face Validity -.01      .00      .00      
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Fairness
An examination of the correlations in Table 4 shows that fairness was
significantly related to all other test perception variables.  The magnitude of the
correlations ranged from  r = .21 to .46 (absolute mean r = .37, SD = .10) in the
multiple–choice test condition and ranged from r = -.33 to .56 (absolute mean r = .42,
SD = .10) in the constructed response test condition.  In general, the relationships
between fairness and the other perception variables were stronger in the constructed
response than the multiple–choice test condition (with the exception of self–efficacy).
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The model in Figure 1 posits that fairness mediates the relationship between
race and test performance, only through its relationship with motivation which is
directly related to test performance.  To test these relationships, two sets of regressions
were computed in accordance with standards outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  The
first set of regressions tested the extent to which fairness mediated the relationship
between race and motivation.  As shown in Table 16, all three criteria for mediation
were met, but there was an increase in the unique variance explained by race (∆R2 = .05
vs. R2 = .03) after controlling for fairness which indicates that fairness was suppressing
the relationship between race and motivation.  The second set of regressions tested the
extent to which motivation mediated the relationship between fairness and test
performance.  As shown in Table 16, the criteria for mediation were not met and hence,
there was no evidence that motivation mediated the relationship between fairness and
test performance.
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Table 16
Mediation Tests for the Relationship among Fairness, Motivation, Anxiety, and Test
Performance from Figure 1
Relationship
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
Race Fairness
Motivation
Motivation Race -.19** .03**
Fairness Race .12*  .01*  
Step 1 Motivation Fairness .24** .06**
Step 2 Motivation Fairness .27** .06**
Race -.22** .11** .05**
Fairness
Motivation Test
Performance
Test Performance Fairness .21** .04**
Motivation Fairness .24** .06**
Step 1 Test Performance Motivation .05    .00    
Step 2 Test Performance Motivation .00    .00    
Fairness .21** .04** .04**
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .01, **p < .001.
Perceived Predictive Validity
An examination of the correlations in Table 4 shows that perceived predictive
validity was significantly related to all other test perception variables.  The magnitude
of the correlations ranged from  r = .19 to .57 (absolute mean r = .38, SD = .16) in the
multiple–choice test condition and ranged from r = -.18 to .62 (absolute mean r = .43,
SD = .18) in the constructed response test condition.  In general, the relationships
between perceived predictive validity and the other perception variables were stronger
in the constructed response than the multiple–choice test condition (with the exception
of stereotype threat).
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The model in Figure 1 posits that perceived predictive validity mediates the
relationship between race and test performance, only through its relationship with
motivation which is directly related to test performance.  To test these relationships,
two sets of regressions were computed in accordance with standards outlined by Baron
and Kenny (1986).  The first set of regressions tested the extent to which perceived
predictive validity mediated the relationship between race and motivation.  The second
set of regressions tested the extent to which motivation mediated the relationship
between perceived predictive validity and test performance.  As shown in Table 17, the
criteria for mediation for both sets of analyses were not met and hence, there was no
evidence for the relationships regarding perceived predictive validity as implied in
Figure 1.
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Table 17
Mediation Tests for the Relationship among Perceived Predictive Validity, Motivation,
Anxiety, and Test Performance from Figure 1
Relationship
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
Race Predictive
Motivation
Motivation Race -.19**  .04**  
Predictive Race .00      .00      
Step 1 Motivation Predictive .15**  .02**  
Step 2 Motivation Predictive .15**  .02**  
Race -.19*** .06*** .04***
Predictive
Motivation Test
Performance
Test Performance Predictive .12**  .02**  
Motivation Predictive .15**  .02**  
Step 1 Test Performance Motivation .05      .00      
Step 2 Test Performance Motivation .04      .00      
Predictive .12*    .02*    .02*    
Note.  APerceived predictive validity.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison
between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for mediation.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Belief in Tests
An examination of the correlations in Table 4 shows that belief in tests was
significantly related to all other test perception variables.  The magnitude of the
correlations ranged from r = .34 to .57 (absolute mean r = .41, SD = .10) in the
multiple–choice test condition and ranged from r = -.36 to .62 (absolute mean r = .49,
SD = .12) in the constructed response test condition.  In general, the relationships
between belief in tests and the other perception variables were stronger in the
constructed response than the multiple–choice test condition (with the exception of
stereotype threat).
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The model in Figure 1 posits that belief in tests mediates the relationship
between race and test performance, only through its relationship with motivation which
is directly related to test performance.  To test these relationships, two sets of
regressions were computed in accordance with standards outlined by Baron and Kenny
(1986).  The first set of regressions tested the extent to which belief in tests mediated
the relationship between race and motivation.  The second set of regressions tested the
extent to which motivation mediated the relationship between belief in tests and test
performance.  As shown in Table 18, the criteria for mediation for both sets of analyses
were not met and hence, there was no evidence for the relationships regarding belief in
tests as implied in Figure 1.
116
Table 18
Mediation Tests for the Relationship among Belief in Tests, Motivation, Anxiety, and
Test Performance from Figure 1
Relationship
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
Race Belief
Motivation
Motivation Race -.19** .03**
Belief Race .00    .00    
Step 1 Motivation Belief .22** .05**
Step 2 Motivation Belief .22** .05**
Race -.19** .08** .03**
Belief Motivation
Test Performance
Test Performance Belief .15** .02**
Motivation Belief .22** .05**
Step 1 Test Performance Motivation .05    .00    
Step 2 Test Performance Motivation .02    .00    
Belief .15*  .02*  .02*  
Note.  ABelief in tests. Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2
for the test for mediation.  *p < .01, **p < .001.
Stereotype Threat
An examination of the correlations in Table 4 shows that stereotype threat was
significantly related to all of the perception variables except for face validity.  The
magnitude of the correlations ranged from  r = -.09 to -.58 (absolute mean r = .32, SD =
.18) in the multiple–choice test condition and ranged from r = -.09 to -.60 (absolute
mean r = .31, SD = .20) in the constructed response test condition.  The relationships
between stereotype threat and the other perception variables were generally equal in
magnitude across the constructed response and the multiple–choice test conditions.
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The model in Figure 1 posits that stereotype threat mediates the relationship
between race and test performance, only through its relationship with anxiety and
motivation which are directly related to test performance.  To test these relationships as
posited in Figure 1, four sets of regressions were computed in accordance with
standards outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  The first two sets of regressions tested
the extent to which stereotype threat mediated the relationship between race and anxiety
and motivation.  However, as shown in Table 19, the criteria for mediation for both sets
of analyses were not met and hence there was no evidence for these relationships.  It is
important to note that the pattern of results for the relationships among race, stereotype
threat and anxiety indicate that stereotype threat may be suppressing the relationship
between race and anxiety (i.e., ∆R2 = .01 vs. R2 = .00) .  However, the criteria for
reciprocal suppression were not met.
The last two sets of regressions tested the extent to which anxiety and
motivation mediated the relationship between stereotype threat and test performance. 
As shown in Table 19, there was evidence to support the position that anxiety partially
mediated the relationship between stereotype threat and test performance.  For example,
all three criteria for mediation were met, there was a significant decrease in the unique
variance explained by stereotype threat (∆R2 = .02 vs. R2 = .10) after controlling for
anxiety, and Sobel's test for the indirect effect of stereotype threat and test performance
through anxiety was significant (Sobel = 2.83, p < .01).  There was no evidence that
motivation mediated the relationship between stereotype threat and test performance. 
Although the criteria for mediation were met, there was no decrease in the unique 
118
Table 19
Mediation Tests for the Relationship among Stereotype Threat, Motivation, Anxiety,
and Test Performance from Figure 1
Relationship
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
Race Stereo
Anxiety
Anxiety Race .06    00    
Stereotype Threat Race -.08    .01    
Step 1 Anxiety Stereotype Threat .66** .44**
Step 2 Anxiety Stereotype Threat .67** .44**
Race .11*  .45*  .01*  
Race Stereo
Motivation
Motivation Race -.19*  .04**
Stereotype Threat Race -.08    .01    
Step 1 Motivation Stereotype Threat -.21** .04**
Step 2 Motivation Stereotype Threat -.23** .04**
Race -.20** .09** .04**
Stereo
Anxiety 
Performance
Test Performance Stereotype Threat -.32** .10**
Anxiety Stereotype Threat .66** .44**
Step 1 Test Performance Anxiety -.31** .10**
Step 2 Test Performance Anxiety -.18*  .10**
Stereotype Threat -.21** .12** .02**
Stereo
Motivation 
Performance
Test Performance Stereotype Threat -.32** .10*  
Motivation Stereotype Threat -.21** .04**
Step 1 Test Performance Motivation .05    .00    
Step 2 Test Performance Motivation -.01    .00    
Stereotype Threat -.33** .10** .10**
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .01, **p < .001.
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variance explained by stereotype threat (∆R2 = .10 vs. R2 = .10) after controlling for
motivation.
In summary, a test of the relationships outlined in Figure 1 regarding stereotype
threat indicated that stereotype threat was related to all the other test perceptions and
anxiety partially mediated the relationship between stereotype threat and test
performance.  However, the results did not support the other relationships described in
Figure 1 regarding stereotype threat.
Self–Efficacy
An examination of the correlations in Table 4 shows that self–efficacy was
significantly related to all of the other perception variables except for face validity.  The
magnitude of the correlations ranged from  r = -.04 to -.58 (absolute mean r = .31, SD =
.21) in the multiple–choice test condition and ranged from r = .20 to -.60 (absolute
mean r = .37, SD = .15) in the constructed response test condition.  In general, the
relationships between self–efficacy and the other perception variables were stronger in
the constructed response than the multiple–choice test condition (with the exception of
fairness).
The model in Figure 1 posits that self–efficacy mediates the relationship
between race and test performance, only through its relationship with anxiety and
motivation which are directly related to test performance.  To test these relationships,
four sets of regressions were computed in accordance with standards outlined by Baron
and Kenny (1986).  The first two sets of regressions tested the extent to which
self–efficacy mediated the relationship between race and anxiety and motivation.  As
shown in Table 20, there was no evidence that
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self–efficacy mediated the relationship between race and anxiety because the criteria for
mediation were not met.  There was some evidence to support the position that
self–efficacy partially mediated the relationship between race and motivation.  For
example, all three criteria for mediation were met, there was a significant decrease in
the unique variance explained by race (∆R2 = .02 vs. R2 = .03) after controlling for
self–efficacy, and Sobel's test for the indirect effect of race and motivation through
self–efficacy was significant (Sobel = 3.92, p < .001).
The last two sets of regressions tested the extent to which anxiety and
motivation mediated the relationship between self–efficacy and test performance.  As
shown in Table 20, there was evidence to support the position that anxiety fully
mediated the relationship between self–efficacy and test performance.  For example, all
three criteria for mediation were met, there was a significant decrease in the unique
variance explained by self–efficacy (∆R2 = .00 vs. R2 = .08) after controlling for
anxiety, and Sobel's test for the indirect effect of self–efficacy and test performance
through anxiety was significant (Sobel = 3.01, p < .01).  Although the pattern of results
for the last set of regressions indicates that motivation may be suppressing the
relationship between self–efficacy and test performance (∆R2 = .09 vs. R2 = .08) , the
criteria for reciprocal suppression were not met.
In summary, a test of the relationships outlined in Figure 1 regarding
self–efficacy indicated that self–efficacy was related to all the other test perceptions,
self–efficacy partially mediated the relationship between race and motivation, and
anxiety fully mediated the relationship between self–efficacy and test performance.
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Table 20
Mediation Tests for the Relationship among Self–Efficacy, Motivation, Anxiety, and
Test Performance from Figure 1
Relationship
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable β R2 ∆R2
Race
Self–Efficacy
Anxiety
Anxiety Race .06    .00    
Self–efficacy Race -.12*  .01*  
Step 1 Anxiety Self–efficacy -.76** .58**
Step 2 Anxiety Self–efficacy -.76** .58**
Race -.03    58** .00    
Race
Self–Efficacy
Motivation
Motivation Race -.19** .03**
Self–efficacy Race -.12*  .01*  
Step 1 Motivation Self–efficacy .44** .20**
Step 2 Motivation Self–efficacy .43** .19**
Race -.14** .21** .02**
Self–Efficacy
Anxiety Test
Performance
Test Performance Self–efficacy .28** .08**
Anxiety Self–efficacy -.76** .58**
Step 1 Test Performance Anxiety -.31** .10**
Step 2 Test Performance Anxiety -.23** .10**
Self–efficacy .10    .10** .00    
Self–Efficacy
Motivation Test
Performance
Test Performance Self–efficacy .28** .08**
Motivation Self–efficacy .44** .20**
Step 1 Test Performance Motivation .05    .00    
Step 2 Test Performance Motivation -.09    .00    
Self–efficacy .32** .09** .09**
Note.  Numbers in bold represent the comparison between ∆R2 and R2 for the test for
mediation.  *p < .05, **p < .001.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The objectives of the present study were to (a) replicate the results of Arthur et
al. (2002) with a larger sample size, (b) empirically examine factors that may explain a
reduction in race–based subgroup differences observed on a constructed response
compared to a multiple–choice test, and (c) assess the criterion–related validity of the
constructed response test.
In general, the pattern of results supported the hypotheses in the predicted
direction.  For example, although there was a reduction in subgroup differences in
performance on the constructed response compared to the multiple–choice test, the
difference was not statistically significant.  However, analyses by specific test content
yielded a significant reduction in subgroup differences on the science reasoning section. 
In addition, all of the hypothesized study variables, with the exception of face validity,
were significantly related to test performance.  Significant subgroup differences were
also obtained for all study variables except belief in tests and stereotype threat.  Further
analyses of the perceptions variables indicated that ratings of test perceptions for
Whites and African Americans differed across the two test formats in the predicted
direction, although significant effects were obtained only for fairness and perceived
predictive validity.  The results also indicate that reading ability, test–taking skills, and
perceived fairness partially mediated the relationship between race and test
performance.  Finally, the criterion–related validity for the constructed response test
was stronger than that for the multiple–choice test.
Efforts to reduce subgroup performance differences in high–stakes testing are
predicated on the assumption that reductions in subgroup differences will ultimately
123
lead to reductions in adverse impact for members of protected classes.  A test or
assessment tool displays adverse impact if there are differential outcomes associated
with the use of the test (e.g., for selection, promotion) as a function of a protected class
status variable (e.g., race, sex).  Adverse impact is typically operationalized in terms of
the 80% or 4/5th rule.  That is, a selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group that is
less than 4/5th or 80% of the rate for the group with the highest rate constitutes adverse
impact (EEOC, 1978).  The degree to which subgroup differences leads to adverse
impact is largely a function of the cutoff score used to determine which test takers
"pass" or "fail" the test.  Thus, in the presence of subgroup differences, how the cutoff
score is established plays a critical role in determining the presence and level of adverse
impact.
Although 70% is a widely used cutoff score in municipal testing, for exploratory
purposes, cutoff scores at the mean and one standard deviation below the mean were
also examined to assess the levels of adverse impact on the multiple–choice and
constructed response tests.  In addition, two separate regression–based cutoff scores for
each test were established by regressing college GPA and high school GPA onto
multiple–choice and constructed response test performance.  The cutoff score for each
test was estimated for college GPA and high school GPA of 2.0 which is considered the
minimum GPA for passing.  These two criteria were chosen because college GPA was
the primary criterion and among all three criterion measures, high school GPA had the
strongest relationship with test performance. The actual raw score cutoff scores for each
test were as follows:  70%, multiple–choice = 14, constructed response = 14; mean,
multiple–choice = 13.4, constructed response = 11.1; one standard deviation below the
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mean, multiple–choice = 9.2, constructed response = 6.9; regression–based cutoff score
using college GPA, multiple–choice = 13.5, constructed response = 10.1; and
regression–based cutoff score using high school GPA, multiple–choice = 10.1,
constructed response = 3.52.
As seen in Figure 7, subgroup differences on both tests resulted in adverse
impact against African Americans using four of the five cutoff scores examined. 
However, the regression–based cutoff scores using high school GPA as the criterion
yielded no adverse impact against African Americans.  Furthermore, with the exception
of the cutoff scores at the mean, levels of adverse impact were lower for the constructed
response test Therefore, the reductions in subgroup differences observed for the
constructed response test translated to less adverse impact than for the multiple–choice
test using four of the five cutoff scores.
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Figure 7.  Levels of adverse impact for the multiple–choice and constructed response
tests. Reg_A = regression–based cutoff score using college GPA and Reg_B =
regression–based cutoff score using high school GPA.
This study contributes to the extant literature concerning the use of alternative
test formats in efforts to reduce subgroup differences on cognitively loaded
paper–and–pencil tests of knowledge, skills, and abilities.  Although not statistically
significant, the pattern of results suggest reductions in subgroup differences were
obtained on the constructed response format compared to the multiple–choice format. 
Furthermore, the reduction in subgroup differences translated into lower levels of
adverse impact on the constructed response test for four of five cutoff scores examined. 
The results also suggest that this reduction in subgroup differences on the constructed
response test may be partially explained by differences in the reading load,
susceptibility to testwiseness, and some test perceptions associated with the two test
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formats.  Although only two of the test perceptions variables (i.e., fairness and
perceived predictive validity) yielded significant subgroup differences across test
format, the means for all other test perception variables were in the predicted direction. 
For example, the trend in the data suggest that African Americans report higher levels
of self–efficacy and a belief in tests than Whites in the constructed response test
condition and view the constructed response test as being more face valid, fairer, and
having more predictive validity than Whites.  Therefore, in general, African Americans
reported more favorable test perceptions for the constructed response test than the
multiple–choice test.  Prior investigations of the viability of alternative test formats
have compared paper–and–pencil and high fidelity test formats such as performance
tests, job simulations, or multi–media presentations.  However, these alternative test
formats have lower economic utility than paper–and–pencil tests because they require
more resources to develop, administer, and score.  Therefore, another advantage of the
constructed response test format presented in the present study is that it preserves the
advantages of paper–and–pencil tests.  Finally, there was no loss in the criterion–related
validity with the use of this alternative format.  In fact, the criterion–related validity for
the constructed response test in the present study was higher than the criterion–related
validity for the multiple–choice test.  Thus, the constructed response format may be a
viable alternative to the traditional paper–and–pencil multiple–choice format in
high–stakes testing in solving the organizational dilemma of using the most valid
predictors of job performance and simultaneously reducing subgroup differences and
subsequent adverse impact on tests of knowledge, skill, ability, and achievement.
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The present research study addressed a common weakness in the extant
literature by drawing a distinction between constructs and methods.  Comparisons of
test methods should hold the construct constant to obtain meaningful results.  To
maximize construct equivalency on the two tests used in the present study, the items on
each test were stem–equivalent.  Holding the construct constant and varying only the
method used to measure the specified construct allowed for the systematic examination
of the impact of test format on subgroup differences. 
Although the items in each test were stem–equivalent, it could be argued that the
two test formats measured substantively different constructs in addition to the intended
constructs (i.e., mathematics and science reasoning).  Indeed, the primary impetus for
the proposed study is that multiple–choice tests may measure irrelevant constructs such
as reading ability, test–taking skills, or test–perceptions (Arthur et al., 2002; Chan &
Schmitt, 1997; Schmitt et al., 1996) in addition to the relevant construct.  Therefore, it
was not expected that there was 100% overlap between the two tests in regards to
construct measurement.  Any variance in test performance attributed to irrelevant
constructs such as reading ability, test–taking skills, and test perceptions may be
different across the two test formats.  In addition, some prior evidence suggests that the
same construct may not be measured similarly by two different test formats (Traub,
1993).  Consistent with this, subsequent analyses by test construct in the present study
indicated that subgroup differences were significantly reduced on the constructed
response test for the science reasoning section, but not the math section.  However, it is
important to note that this effect was obtained with a decrease in test performance on
the constructed response test.  
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Based on the present results, it is plausible that math tests are less influenced by
test format because the measurement of extraneous variables is minimized due to the
nature of responses to math questions that require computations, regardless of the
response format.  In contrast, constructs such as science reasoning may introduce the
measurement of extraneous variables (e.g., reading ability and test–taking skills) that
contaminate predictor scores and are therefore more likely to be influenced by changing
the test format.  Therefore, the constructed response test format may yield greater
reductions in subgroup differences for constructs that are structurally similar to science
reasoning than math.
Another contribution of the present study was the examination of
factors—reading ability, test–taking skills, and test perceptions—that might explain
why changes in test format may reduce subgroup differences.  For example, based on
the extant literature (e.g., Chan & Schmitt, 1997; Sacco et al., 2000), it was expected
that reading ability would be one of the strongest explanatory variables for the
reduction in subgroup differences.  Next, several studies have shown that perceptions of
and reactions to specified tests are related to test performance with some research
revealing the existence of subgroup differences on various test perceptions (Ryan,
2001).  Third, a review of the literature revealed weak and sometimes inconclusive
results on the relationship among race, test–taking skills, and test performance.  Thus, it
was difficult, based on prior research, to anticipate the role of test–taking skills in the
relationship between race and test performance.
Because of differences in the reading load of the two test formats, it was
predicted that reading ability would partially mediate the race/test performance
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relationship.  All but one of the hypotheses were supported regarding reading ability. 
Specifically, there was a strong relationship between reading ability and test
performance (Hypothesis 2a) and there were subgroup differences in reading ability
(Hypothesis 2c).  However, the reading ability/multiple–choice test performance
relationship did not differ from the reading ability/constructed response test
performance relationship (Hypothesis 2b).  Finally, evidence for partial mediation of
reading ability was obtained, but the strength of the effect was not sufficient to
significantly reduce levels of subgroup differences in multiple–choice test performance
to the levels observed on the constructed response test after statistically controlling for
reading ability (Hypothesis 2d).
Prior research (Benson et al., 1986; Diamond et al., 1976; Rogers & Yang,
1996) suggests that Whites and African Americans do not differ in test–taking skills.  In
addition, the influence of training for test–taking skills has exhibited only a weak
relationship with test performance (e.g., Bangert–Drowns et al., 1983; Dolly &
Williams, 1986).  Nevertheless, this variable was examined in the present study because
the two test formats were expected to differ in their susceptibility to testwiseness cues. 
The results for test–taking skills were similar to those for reading ability.  That is,
support was obtained for a relationship between test–taking skills and test performance
(Hypothesis 3a) and there were subgroup differences in test–taking skills (Hypothesis
3c).  However, the test–taking skills/multiple–choice test performance relationship did
not differ from the test–taking skills/constructed response test performance relationship
(Hypothesis 3b).  Finally, evidence for partial mediation of test–taking skills was
obtained, but the strength of the effect was not sufficient to significantly reduce the
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levels of subgroup differences in multiple–choice test performance to the levels
observed on the constructed response test after statistically controlling for test–taking
skills (Hypothesis 3d).
Sackett et al. (2001) suggested that minimizing race–based performance
differences through altering test perceptions is not likely to have a large effect on test
scores.  Nevertheless, perceptions were investigated in the present study since prior
research (Chan et al., 1998; Ryan et al., 2000; Schmitt & Mills, 2001) suggests that test
perceptions such as face validity, fairness, perceived predictive validity, and
self–efficacy may be related to test performance.  In addition, it was hypothesized that
test perceptions would differ across the two test formats.  The results indicated that all
test perceptions, with the exception of face validity, were related to test performance. 
Subgroup differences were also obtained for fairness and perceived predictive validity. 
Specifically, the results indicated that African Americans perceived the constructed
response test to be fairer and also have higher predictive validity than Whites.  In
contrast, Whites perceived the multiple–choice test to be fairer and have higher
predictive validity than African Americans.  Only perceived fairness appeared to
partially mediate the relationship between race and test performance, but the strength
for mediation was not sufficient to significantly reduce levels of subgroup differences in
multiple–choice test performance to the levels observed on the constructed response test
after statistically controlling for fairness.
The conceptual model presented in Figure 1 implies that the test perception
variables are interrelated, that each test perception variable mediates the relationship
between race and test–taking motivation and/or anxiety, and that test–taking motivation
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and anxiety mediate the relationship between test perceptions and performance. 
Although no hypotheses were specified for these relationships, they were evaluated to
test the entire model presented in Figure 1.  With a few exceptions, the intercorrelations
among the perception variables were significant.  Tests for mediation among
perceptions, test–taking motivation, test–taking anxiety, and test performance indicated
that only self–efficacy mediated the relationship between race and test–taking
motivation.  Furthermore, the results suggested that anxiety mediated the relationship
between both stereotype threat and self efficacy and test performance.  No other
significant relationships were obtained.
Another contribution to the extant literature is that criterion–related validity
evidence was obtained for both test formats.  Previous examinations of subgroup
differences on alternative predictors of job performance have typically failed to provide
any criterion–related validity evidence.  Although a reliance on content–related validity
evidence may not in and of itself be deficient, the additional demonstration of
criterion–related validity further bolsters the efficacy and utility of the constructed
response test.  Consistent with the hypothesized effects, the criterion–related validity of
the constructed response and multiple–choice tests were similar.  Furthermore, the
criterion–related validity for the constructed response test was similar for African
Americans and Whites.  This is consistent with meta–analytic findings that validity
differences by race seldom occurs (Hunter, Schmidt, & Hunter, 1979; Schmidt,
Pearlman, & Hunter, 1980).  Consequently, there was no loss of criterion–related
validity using a constructed response format as an alternative to multiple–choice tests of
knowledge, skills, and abilities.
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Limitations
The primary limitation of the present study is that reductions in subgroup
differences were obtained with a decrease in test performance on the constructed
response compared to the multiple–choice test.  Although using the constructed
response test preserved the advantages of paper–and–pencil tests and reduced subgroup
differences, the cost was a decrement in performance for all test takers.  This
performance difference may be interpreted within the context of the well documented
differences in performance between tests of recognition and recall (Anderson, 1999). 
That is, all things being equal, performance on recognition tests (e.g., multiple–choice)
is generally better than that on recall tests (e.g., constructed response).
It is recognized that compared to multiple–choice items, the scoring of write–in
items similar to those used in the constructed response test is more labor intensive and
obviously introduces an element of subjectivity in the scoring process.  These are not
necessarily insurmountable problems, as highlighted by the extensive use of
employment interviews that are by definition, very subjective and labor intensive in
both administration and scoring.  Furthermore, compared to the cost of developing,
administering, and scoring a performance test, the relative cost of scoring a write–in test
is comparably small.  Finally, although constructed, the relatively constrained responses
(compared to an essay) used in the specific constructed response test format presented
here made it possible to readily standardize the scoring and accomplish it in an efficient
and psychometrically sound manner; it took on average 55 seconds to score a test, and
the preconsensus interscorer agreement was high (96% at Time 1 and 99% at Time 2).
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One possible reason why subgroup differences on the constructed response test
were not significantly reduced compared to the multiple–choice test is that the reading
load of each test was comparable.  If reading ability is an explanation for reductions in
subgroup differences on tests with lower reading demands, then ideally, reading loads
across the two test formats should be maximally different (e.g., performance tests vs.
paper–and–pencil tests).  The constructed response test in the present study contained
27% fewer words than the multiple–choice test, and this reduction in reading load may
not have been sufficient to obtain significant reductions in subgroup differences.  For
example, although there were 24% fewer words on the math section of the constructed
response than the multiple–choice test, all alternatives (and hence all of the missing
"words") for the 10 items in the multiple–choice test were numbers.  So, reading
demands would have been higher if the alternatives were text– instead of
number–based.  In addition, there were 27% fewer words on the science reasoning
section of the constructed response than the multiple–choice test.  However, on the
science reasoning section, background materials associated with the items were
presented on both tests which still presented a heavy reading load on the constructed
response test.  This could explain why reductions in observed subgroup differences on
the constructed response test in the present study were not as small as those obtained by
Arthur et al. (2002) in the within–subjects design (d = .12) on their constructed response
test which contained no background materials (the constructed response test used in
their study contained 60% fewer words than the multiple–choice test).  Nevertheless,
the minimal reduction in reading load on the present constructed response test was
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sufficient to obtain a reduction in subgroup differences (although it did not reach
significance).
It is important to note that reading ability is considered an extraneous variable
only in situations in which reading ability is not a job requirement.  That is, to the
extent that reading ability is not required for the job, the measurement of reading ability
in conjunction with job–relevant constructs reduces the construct validity of a selection
or promotional test.  However, in the present research design, reading ability is related
to the criterion (i.e., college GPA).  Therefore, the reductions in subgroup differences
on the constructed response test explained by reading ability in the present academic
setting are practically significant.  The impact of using a constructed response test
should only be stronger in selection or promotional settings where reading ability is not
required.
Another limitation of the present study was the weak psychometric properties of
some of the measures.  Specifically, relatively low score reliabilities were obtained for
the measures of test–taking skills (.57), fairness (.64), and stereotype threat (.47). 
Although the measure of test–taking skills used in the present study (Gibb, 1964) is
generally considered the best measure of test–taking skills (Harmon et al., 1996; Miller
et al., 1990), the internal consistency reported in the test manual for the full 70–item
measure is only .72.  Therefore, the reduction in items from 70 to 20 in the present
study may have substantially altered the reliability and validity of the original test.  This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that contrary to expectations, there was no
relationship in the present study between test–taking skills and experience with taking
multiple–choice or constructed response tests.  A Spearman–Brown correction was
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applied to the reliability coefficient obtained in the present study (.57 for the 20–item
measure) for the measure of test–taking skills to estimate the reliability for the full
70–item measure (.82) in the present sample.
Another potential limitation of the present study is the generalizability of the
findings.  The present study was conducted in a laboratory setting in which there were
no real consequences associated with the test scores.  Although participants reported
exhibiting "quite a bit of effort" and the top 20 scorers were awarded $30 to increase
motivation, participants may have exhibited less effort on the test than in real world
organizational settings.  As such, this is a potential threat to the ecological validity of
the study.  It is expected that reductions in subgroup differences on constructed
response tests will be larger in high–stakes testing situations for which this intervention
strategy is designed.
The decision to use items from the ACT for the multiple–choice and constructed
response test in the present study was based on several factors.  First, this is an
operational test that is used for selection into universities and colleges so using this test
emulates the selection models applied by organizations in the measurement of
knowledge, skill, ability, and achievement to predict future job performance.  Second,
use of the ACT allowed for the collection of real criterion data (i.e., college GPA)
because it is a selection tool employed by universities for selection.  However, a major
disadvantage of the ACT in the present study is the presence of heavy reading demands
which are relevant to the prediction of college performance.  As a result, the reading
load on the constructed response test was minimally reduced (i.e., by 27%).  As noted
previously, this minimal reduction in reading load may have resulted in the weak effect
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sizes obtained for the relationships tested.  Future comparisons of the constructed
response and multiple–choice test formats in lab–based settings should use tests that
more closely resemble tests of knowledge, skill, ability, and achievement used in
operational job settings.  These knowledge–, skill–, ability–, or achievement–based
tests, especially for jobs characterized by less reading demands, typically have lower
reading loads.  As a result, differences in reading demands, and subsequently, subgroup
differences between multiple–choice and constructed response formats may be larger. 
Even more desirable would be field studies which allow for the collection of research
data to test explanations for reductions in subgroup differences.
Another suggestion for future research is to explore other measures of
test–taking skills that are shorter than Gibb's Experimental Test of Testwiseness (1964)
and have better psychometric properties than the version used in the present study.  For
example, Bruch (1981) asked test takers to describe the test–taking strategies they used
on a specific test.  These statements were then coded by experimenters into categories
and given a score to represent the total number of strategies used and the relative
effectiveness of the strategies.  In another study, Ellis and Ryan (1999) had test takers
endorse items on a checklist describing various effective and ineffective test–taking
strategies participants used on the test.
In summary, the pattern of results supported the hypotheses in the predicted
direction for most variables.  For example, reductions in subgroup differences were
obtained on the constructed response format compared to the multiple–choice format. 
Furthermore, the reductions in subgroup differences translated into lower levels of
adverse impact on the constructed response test for four of five cutoff scores examined. 
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The results also suggested that this reduction in subgroup differences on the constructed
response test may be partially explained by differences in the reading load,
susceptibility to testwiseness, and some test perceptions associated with the two test
formats.  In addition, the results suggested that African Americans had more favorable
perceptions of the constructed response than the multiple–choice test.  Finally, there
was no loss in the criterion–related validity with the use of this alternative format.  In
fact, the criterion–related validity of the constructed response test in the present study
was higher than the criterion–related validity of the multiple–choice test.  The
constructed response format presented also retains many of the advantages of
paper–and–pencil multiple–choice tests such as low cost of development,
administration, and scoring, relatively objective scoring, and comparable
criterion–related validity.  However, it has the potential, added advantage of reducing
subgroup differences in test performance via reading ability, test–taking skills, and test
perceptions.  Therefore, it may be a more desirable alternative to the traditional
multiple–choice format in high–stakes testing in efforts to solve the organizational
dilemma.
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APPENDIX A
Experimental Test of Testwiseness
Please do not turn this page of the test booklet until directed to do so.
PLEASE DO NOT WRITE ON OR OTHERWISE MARK THIS TEST BOOKLET.
There are a total of 20 items on this test and you have a total of 10 minutes to complete
ALL items.   In each of the following items, select the alternative that you think is the
BEST answer and record your choice by filling in the appropriate space on the
scantron.  Solve as many items as you can.  Continue working until you have answered
all of the questions or until you are told to stop.  Your score is based on the number of
correct responses.  Since there is no penalty for incorrect answers, it is to your
advantage to attempt every question.
NOTE:  The items are located on the front and back of each page.
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1. The Locarno Pact:
A. is an international agreement for the maintenance of peace through the
guarantee of national boundaries of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and
other countries of western Europe.
B. allowed France to occupy the Ruhr Valley.
C. provided for the dismemberment of Austria–Hungary.
D. provided for the protection of Red Cross bases during war times.
2. Henry George is associated with the:
A. growth of the general disaffection of the working man.
B. development of the beauties of the great unsettled areas.
C. settlement of land all across the western part of the country.
D. the Single Tax program.
3. One trait which the Xerxes of Aeschylus and the Croesus of Herodotus' Solon
episode have in common is their:
A. overconfidence in their own power and wealth.
B. racial prejudice.
C. imperialism.
D. superstitiousness.
4. The career of Marius (155–86 B.C.), the opponent of Sulla, is significant in
Roman history because:
A. he gave many outstanding dinners and entertainments for royalty.
B. he succeeded in arming the gladiators.
C. he showed that the civil authority could be thrust aside by the military.
D. he made it possible for the popular party to conduct party rallies outside
the city of Rome.
5. Horace in his 16th Epode typifies:
A. the despair of the average man when confronted by sweeping social
change and its consequent social strains.
B. the optimism of the average Roman nobleman.
C. the joy of the common people.
D. the despair of the political moderate.
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6. The first systematic attempt to establish the Alexandrian synthesis between
Christian religious belief and Greek civilization was undertaken at:
A. Rome.
B. Alexandria.
C. Athens.
D. Jerusalem.
7. In Roman times industry failed to attract science to its service because the:
A. Romans never understood Greek science.
B. Greeks and Romans despised industry as unworthy of citizens and fee
men.
C. Romans continually destroyed Greek scientific institutions, especially
the Museum at Alexandria.
D. scientific method was completely unknown to the ancients.
8. The industrial revolution in Germany had its greatest momentum:
A. in the years following the unification of Germany, i.e., from 1871 to
1890.
B. after the first World War, when Germany, through the loss of territory,
was forced to turn to industrialization on a large scale to make a living.
C. in the 18th century, when several of her absolutist states, adopting
mercantilist policies, were pushing industrialization very vigorously.
D. before the war of 1870–71 in which industrial superiority over France
was the main factor responsible for German victory.
9. The liberalizing tendencies of Czar Alexander II came to an end with the:
A. Civil War in America.
B. Polish insurrection of 1863.
C. signing of the Treaty of Calcutta in 1898.
D. radicalism of the first directorate in France.
10. The expressions "Cavaliers" and "Roundheads" came into use during the
struggle between:
A. Lincoln and his congress.
B. Charles I and Parliament.
C. the American colonies and Canada.
D. the Protestants and the Jews.
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11. The Directory:
A. governed France from 1795 to 1799.
B. was overthrown in the 19th century.
C. was the only honest government France has had.
D. was established after the Crimean War.
12. The Locarno Pact:
A. was an agreement between Greece and Turkey.
B. gave the Tyrol to Italy.
C. was a conspiracy to blow up the League of Nations' building at Locarno.
D. guaranteed the boundary arrangements in western Europe.
13. The Progressive Party in 1912:
A. favored complete protective tariffs.
B. favored an appointed Congress.
C. favored the creation of a non–partisan tariff commission.
D. favored restriction of the ballot to certain influential persons.
14. The leading cause of the panic of 1873 was:
A. the deteriorated moral fiber of American Protestants.
B. the assassination of President Lincoln.
C. the overbuilding of railroads.
D. the corruption of the Mormon ruling hierarchy.
15. The Webster–Ashburton Treaty settled a long–standing dispute between Great
Britain and the United States over:
A. the Maine boundary.
B. numerous contested claims to property as well as many other sources of
ill–will.
C. damages growing out of the War of 1812 and subsequent events.
D. fishing rights on the Great Lakes and in international waters.
16. The Bland–Allison act:
A. made all other forms of money redeemable in gold.
B. standardized all gold dollars in terms of silver and copper.
C. made none of the paper money redeemable in silver.
D. directed the Treasury department to purchase a certain amount of silver
bullion each month.
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17. Roman imperialism affected landholding by:
A. increasing the number of small farms.
B. eliminating farming in favor of importing all food stuffs.
C. bringing about a more democratic division of land.
D. increasing the number of large estates and reducing the number of small
farms thereby increasing the number of landless persons.
18. Charles I and the British Parliament, in their struggles for dominance, developed
supporting factions called:
A. Reds and Whites.
B. Cavaliers and Roundheads.
C. Lancastrians and Yorkists.
D. Royalists and Populists.
19. The first great written code of laws was:
A. the Twelve Tables.
B. Corpus Juris Civilis.
C. Hammurabi's Codus Juris.
D. Draco's Juris Categorus.
20. In Roman history, a very famous political controversy developed around the
relative power of the civil as opposed to the military components of government. 
Sulla defended the position that the civil authority was supreme.  His opponent,
who favored military authority, was:
A. Marius.
B. Cicero.
C. Phidias.
D. Polybius.
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APPENDIX B
Post–Test Questionnaire
DIRECTIONS
We would like some feedback concerning your overall level of motivation to perform
well in the present study and your experience with taking standardized achievement
tests.  Standardized achievement tests are tests for which norms on a reference group,
ordinarily drawn from many schools or communities, are provided.  Examples of
standardized achievement tests are the Stanford Achievement Test and Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS), and college admissions tests like the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and American College Testing exam (ACT).
Read each of the questions below and write in or bubble the circle on the accompanying
scale that corresponds to your answer.
1. How motivated were you to do your best on each of the tests in this study
(i.e., Test Attitudes and Perceptions Survey, Achievement Test, Advanced
Progressive Matricies, Reading Comprehension, and History tests)?
 Not at all motivated
 Somewhat motivated
 Quite a bit motivated
 Very motivated
 Extremely motivated
2. How many MULTIPLE–CHOICE standardized achievement tests such as
the ones described above have you taken within the last four (4) years?
 None  4
 1  5
 2  More than 5
 3
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3. Preparation courses are any courses that instruct participants on strategies for
taking standardized achievement tests such as the SAT or ACT.  Examples of
common preparation courses are the Kaplan and Princeton Reviews.
How many test–taking preparation courses have you taken?
 None  3
 1  4
 2  More than 4
4. How much experience have you had taking WRITE–IN or
FILL–IN–THE–BLANK tests within the last four (4) years?
 Not at all experienced
 Somewhat experienced
 Quite a bit experienced
 Very experienced
 Extremely experienced
5. What is your current cumulative grade point average (GPA) at your current
university? Please round up or down as necessary if your exact GPA falls
between an interval (e.g., a 3.47 would fall in the interval of 3.5–4.0).
 3.5–4.0  1.5–1.9
 3.0–3.4  1.0–1.4
 2.5–2.9  Below 1.0
 2.0–2.4  I do not yet have a GPA at my
current university (e.g., 1st
semester freshman)
6. What was your cumulative grade point average (GPA) in high school?  Please
round up or down as necessary if your exact GPA falls between an interval
(e.g., a 3.47 would fall in the interval of 3.5–4.0).
 3.5–4.0  1.5–1.9
 3.0–3.4  1.0–1.4
 2.5–2.9  Below 1.0
 2.0–2.4
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7. What was your approximate graduating high school percentile rank?
 1st – 5th   percentile  21st – 25th percentile
 6th – 10th percentile  26th – 30th percentile
 11th – 15th percentile  Below the 30th percentile
 16th – 20th percentile
8. What was your best overall SAT (or ACT) score?                                             
9. Please estimate how many items (out of 20)
on the Achievement Test that you expect to get correct?                                    
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STEREOTYPE THREAT
DIRECTIONS
The following questions ask you to rate your general attitudes and perceptions about
standardized tests and your test–taking abilities.  Read each of the questions below and
check or bubble the circle on the accompanying scale that corresponds to your answer.
Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Neither
Disagree or
Agree Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
1. I feel confident about my abilities.
2. I feel self–conscious when taking tests.
3. Tests are often used as a way to discriminate against
racial minority group members (i.e.,
African–Americans).
4. I do not feel tests should be used to select people into
college or for jobs.
5. African–Americans typically do worse than Whites
on standardized tests.
6. I am a good test–taker.
7. I expect to be among the top 20 scorers on the test I
completed in this study and therefore expect to win
the $30 reward
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APPENDIX C
Test Attitudes and Perceptions Survey
DIRECTIONS
The following questions ask you to rate your general attitudes and perceptions about the
test you are about to take.  Your attitudes should be based on the information in the
instruction set read aloud to you and the sample items you just completed.  Read each of
the questions below and check or bubble the circle on the accompanying scale that
corresponds to your answer.
Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Neither
Disagree or
Agree Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Motivation
1. Doing well on this test is important to me.
2. I want to do well on this test.
3. I will try my best on this test.
4. I will try to do the very best I can do on this test.
5. While taking this test, I will concentrate and try to do
well
6. I want to be among the top scorers on this test.
7. I will push myself to work hard on this test.
8. I am extremely motivated to do well on this test.
9. I just don't care how I do on this test.
10. I won't put much effort into this test.
Belief in Tests
11. How well a person scores on this test is a good
indication of how well they will do in college classes.
12. Tests are a good way of selecting people for college.
Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Neither
Disagree or
Agree Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
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13. This kind of test should be eliminated.
14. I don't believe that tests are valid.
Anxiety
15. I probably won't do as well as most of the other
people who take this test.
16. I am not good at taking tests.
17. During a test, I often think about how poorly I am
doing
18. I usually get very anxious about taking tests.
19. I usually do pretty well on tests.
20. I expect to be among the people who score really well
on this test.
21. My test scores don't usually reflect my true abilities.
22. I very much dislike taking tests of this type.
23. For this test, I find myself thinking of the
consequences of failing.
24. During a test, I get so nervous I can't do as well as I
should have.
Self–Efficacy
25. I believe I will perform well on this test.
26. I am generally good at performing well on
standardized tests.
27. Compared with other participants in this study, I
expect to do well on this test.
Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Neither
Disagree or
Agree Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
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Face Validity
28. I do not understand what this test has to do with work
required in college courses
29. I cannot see any relationship between this test and
what is required in college courses.
30. It would be obvious to anyone that this test is related
to college performance.
31. The actual content of this test is clearly related to the
work required in college courses.
32. There is no real connection between the test that I'm
about to take and college courses
Perceived Predictive Validity
33. Failing to pass this test clearly indicates that you can't
pass many college courses.
34. I am confident that this test can predict how well a
student will perform in college courses
35. My performance on this test is a good indicator of my
ability to perform well in college courses.
36. Students who perform well on this type of test are
more likely to do well in college courses than students
who perform poorly on this type of test.
37. College admissions counselors could tell a lot about a
student's ability to perform in college based on the
results of this test.
Perceived Fairness
38. The test results will accurately reflect how well I
performed on this test.
39. I deserve the test results that I will receive on this test.
Strongly
Disagree Disagree
Neither
Disagree or
Agree Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
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40. This test will fairly reflect my ability to perform well
in college courses.
41. Overall, I believe that this test is fair.
42. I feel good about the way this test will be conducted
and administered.
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APPENDIX D
Demographic Form
DIRECTIONS
The following questions will provide us with demographic information concerning the
participants that complete these measures.  None of the information will be used to
identify you personally.  All data will be analyzed by group averages and not by
individual responses.  Read each of the questions below and write in your answer or
bubble the circle on the accompanying scale that corresponds to your answer.
1. What is your age in years?                                             
2. What is your race?
 American Indian  Hispanic
 Asian  White
 African American  Other
3. What is your sex?
 Male
 Female
4. What is your college classification?
 Freshman  Senior
 Sophomore  Graduate Student
 Junior
5. What is your current cumulative grade point average (GPA) at your current
university? Please round up or down as necessary if your exact GPA falls
between an interval (e.g., a 3.47 would fall in the interval of 3.5–4.0).
 3.5–4.0  1.5–1.9
 3.0–3.4  1.0–1.4
 2.5–2.9  Below 1.0
 2.0–2.4  I do not yet have a GPA at my
current university (e.g., 1st
semester freshman)
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6. What was your cumulative grade point average (GPA) in high school?  Please
round up or down as necessary if your exact GPA falls between an interval
(e.g., a 3.47 would fall in the interval of 3.5–4.0).
 3.5–4.0  1.5–1.9
 3.0–3.4  1.0–1.4
 2.5–2.9  Below 1.0
 2.0–2.4
7. What was your approximate graduating high school percentile rank?
 1st – 5th   percentile  21st – 25th percentile
 6th – 10th percentile  26th – 30th percentile
 11th – 15th percentile  Below the 30th percentile
 16th – 20th percentile
8. What was your best overall SAT (or ACT) score?                                              
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